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My study of undercover policing explores the ways in which democratic legal systems 
change when they legalize highly contested police practices that have long been quietly tolerated 
and accorded minimal scrutiny.  Undercover policing is a prime of example of such a practice.  It 
has long been subject to remarkably little legislative oversight and systematic regulation in the 
United States and Western Europe.  It exists in a twilight of legality—a necessary evil, but one 
inviting anxieties about its legitimacy and consonance with the rule of law.  Under pressure from 
the European Court of Human Rights, Germany (along with other Western European countries) 
has attempted to regulate covert operations in a more systematic fashion.  The German 
experience examined in my article suggests how difficult it is to tame and legitimate a constantly 
changing and normatively contested practice such as undercover policing.  The article contrasts 
German attempts to create an explicit legal basis for this power –and a comprehensive regulatory 
system – with American willingness to leave covert practices largely unregulated.  The article 
focuses on the consequences of these divergent approaches for the legitimacy of covert practices.  
German legal and administrative reforms succeeded in improving legitimacy along some 
dimensions while undermining it along others, and, indeed, introducing new bases on which the 
legitimacy of undercover police work is subject to challenge.  In the United States, by contrast, 
law enforcement agencies have succeeded in defusing a variety of reform initiatives through 
internal reforms, with little legislative or judicial supervision.  As a result, many problems of 
legitimacy persist – with little visibility.  American challenges to the legitimacy of covert tactics 
now focus less on criminal cases than on the use of such tactics in domestic intelligence 
investigation.   
 
My analysis of German covert policing rests on 89 field interviews that I conducted 
between 2002 and 2004 with state and federal police officials, undercover agents, training and 
supervisory officials, control officers, prosecutors, and judges in fifteen of the sixteen German 
states.  I also compared evidence from interviews with a variety of written sources, including 
ministry guidelines, training materials, prosecutors’ memoranda, judicial opinions, scholarly 
criticism, and news stories.  The open-ended, qualitative field interviews are at the heart of the 
project.  They help to uncover the principles animating otherwise shadowy German covert 
operations.  And they illustrate the dilemmas inherent in the practices; the obstacles to reform; 
and the different tradeoffs which the American and German regulatory systems have made in 
securing the legitimacy of these practices.   
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The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the 
United States and Germany 
 
Jacqueline E. Ross1
· In 2003, Germany moved to outlaw the extremist right wing National 
Democratic Party (“NDP”) claiming that it was working to subvert the democratic 
constitutional order through its extreme and racist rhetoric.  The Federal Constitutional 
Court dismissed the government’s petition after it turned out that one of the party leaders, 
whose public rhetoric formed a centerpiece of the government’s case, had in fact been an 
informant for most of his thirty years in the party. There were others. As it turned out, 
numerous of Germany’s seventeen domestic  intelligence agencies had been investigating 
the NDP simultaneously for decades, unbeknownst to each other.  Almost fifteen percent 
of the leadership worked for one of the government’s intelligence services.   These 
infiltrators had participated in setting the party’s agenda and publicizing its goals. A 
divided Federal Constitutional Court ultimately dismissed the government’s petition 
because the dangers that the political organization posed without the influence of 
infiltrators proved almost impossible to determine.2
I: Introduction 
 
In an age when threats to democracies spur governments to resort more freely to covert 
surveillance, it is worth asking how these extraordinary operations should be controlled and 
conceptualized.  If the infiltration of terrorist and criminal organizations has become 
indispensable, how ubiquitous should such tactics become, and how should regulatory systems 
respond to their increased importance?  Which legal and institutional features mark covert tactics 
as exceptional, and which render them routine?  What are the challenges of taming the constantly 
changing and highly contested practices of undercover policing, which stubbornly resist 
oversight?  Legal systems differ in their concerns about undercover surveillance and in their 
willingness to deploy covert agents and informants against a spectrum of perceived threats 
ranging from national security dangers like terrorism or political and religious extremism to 
organized crime, drug trafficking, and more ordinary forms of criminality.   In most democracies, 
political elites, legal actors, and critics agree that undercover investigations are in some sense a 
necessary evil.  But national legal systems vary in what they mean by that.  They have disparate 
conceptions of what makes covert investigations troublesome; of the proper goals of infiltration; 
and of the mechanisms by which undercover tactics should be legitimated and controlled.  In 
 
1 Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law; Assistant United States Attorney [federal 
prosecutor], Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) (1990-2000).  I would like to thank the German Academic 
Exchange Service (DAAD) for its support of visits to Germany to interview undercover agents, police supervisors, 
prosecutors, and judges.  For help and advice, the author would like to thank: Albert Alschuler, Rachel Barkow, 
Jennifer Collins, Cyrille Fijnaut, Bernard Harcourt, Friedrich Katz, Orin Kerr, Maximo Langer, Andrew Leipold, 
Gary Marx, Richard McAdams, Erin Murphy, Daniel Richman, Richard Ross, Daniel Solove, and participants at law 
school workshops at George Washington University, the University of Illinois, and Yale University. 
2 BVerfGE 107, 339-395 (2003). 
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short, legal systems forge different regulatory compromises and accord different degrees of 
legitimacy to the “necessary evil” of covert operations.  
 
Under pressure from the European Court of Human Rights to integrate covert practices 
with other criminal procedures and thus control them better, European legal systems, including 
Germany,3 France4 and Italy5 have legislated systematically about undercover policing since the 
late 1980s.  They have had to spell out the terms on which covert tactics can be made consonant 
with the rule of law.  Among these initiatives, Germany’s represents perhaps the most sustained 
and self-conscious effort to control and legitimate undercover policing.    The German project of 
taming previously unregulated covert practices  can tell us a great deal about the different senses 
in which a twilight practice may be legitimated as a “necessary evil” and about the historical, 
legal, and institutional factors on which the legitimacy of this practice depends.  
 
My essay examines German undercover policing as both a topic in its own right and as a 
contrast case that helps identify distinctive features of the American system of covert operations.  
The systems under comparison can, in Clifford Geertz’s words, “form a kind of commentary on  
the other’s character.”6 Each can suggest what is important and troubling about the other.  Each 
can highlight features of the other that would seem less noteworthy if examined in isolation, 
without the benefit of comparison.   
 
The value of the contrast between German and American approaches emerges in part 
from the inherently problematic nature of undercover policing, which each system must confront.   
The NDP scandal displayed in microcosm many of the intrinsic dilemmas of undercover 
operations for societies committed to the separation of powers, federalism, protection of 
individual liberties, and the rule of law.   Informants and covert agents invade privacy, sow 
mistrust, and disrupt privileged communications between reporters and sources, lawyers and 
clients, doctors and patients and husbands and wives.  For the sake of gathering evidence 
covertly, governments at least temporarily tolerate and even encourage crimes that they 
ultimately hope to suppress.  Because infiltrators sometimes become participants in the illegal 
activities they investigate, undercover operations compromise the state while to some extent 
shaping or contaminating the phenomena under study.  The close relationship between covert 
agents and targets creates the risk that the state will lose control of its personnel in the field.  And 
as the NDP proceedings revealed so dramatically, covert tactics also create special institutional 
problems of communication and coordination when overlapping investigative agencies function 
autonomously in a decentralized federal structure.  Though these dilemmas and dynamics are 
intrinsic to undercover tactics, the ways in which they play themselves out vary with the legal, 
institutional, and historical context in which covert policing takes place.    
 
My study of German covert policing rests on 89 field interviews that I conducted between 
2002 and 2004 with state and federal police officials, undercover agents, training and 
supervisory officials, control officers, prosecutors, and judges in fifteen of the sixteen German 
 
3 St PO 110. 
4 "Loi n° 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant adaptation de la justice aux évolutions de la criminalité" 
5 Legge di giugno, 1990 n. 162, Art. 25(1), Art. 97; legge di dicembre, 1992, n. 356, Art. 12 quater; 1998, n. 269(1), 
Art. 14.  
6 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Princeton, 1971), 4. 
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states.7 My sources did not, of course, provide unbiased information.  I arranged the interviews 
in order to cross-check statements and perspectives.  I compared claims made by sources against 
information provided by: (a) colleagues in their own agency; (b) counterparts in other states; and 
(c) personnel in other parts of the legal system (checking variations in accounts by police 
officers, prosecutors, and judges).8 I also compared evidence from interviews with a variety of 
written sources, including ministry guidelines, training materials, prosecutors’ memoranda, 
judicial opinions, scholarly criticism, and news stories, including a confessional narrative 
published by a former undercover agent.9
My essay proceeds as follows.  Section II will describe the principles and norms that 
simultaneously restrain covert powers in Germany and raise troubling questions about their 
legitimacy.  This section will also delineate the legislative and institutional reforms by which 
Germany sought to reducible these problems of legitimacy.  “Legitimacy” is a term with many 
meanings.  In section III, I offer a particular account of legitimacy useful for studying 
undercover policing and for comparing the legitimacy of covert practices in the United States 
and Germany.  My account of legitimacy will tacitly inform later sections of the paper. I will 
return to a sustained evaluation of legitimacy in the final section on undercover policing as a 
necessary evil.   
 
In comparing the covert policing systems of the United States and Germany, I will 
address both those concerns about infiltration that are unique to Germany and those dilemmas—
inherent to covert practices—which every regulatory system must confront.   Section IV will 
examine some of the historical reasons for German wariness about undercover policing and 
contrast the American and German regulatory approaches.  Section V will explore the reasons 
why some of Germany’s fears about undercover policing have no real counterpart in the United 
States and will discuss the extent to which Germany’s regulatory system succeeded in addressing 
these concerns.   
 
Section VI will examine the persistence of “legitimacy deficits” that stem from troubling 
dilammas inherent in covert operations—which both the United States and Germany must 
confront.  Agents should not commit crimes but must do so to fit in with their targets.  
Operatives should not encourage their targets to violate the law, yet they must facilitate criminal 
activity in ways that allow it to be proved.  Agents must document and describe what they 
observe, yet in doing so they help shape the criteria by which their efforts are judged.   These 
features are common to covert policing everywhere.  Section VI will contrast German and 
American regulatory approaches to these shared dilemmas.  The compromises that each system 
adopts give rise to distinctive problems of legitimacy and thus to different national 
 
7 For reasons of security, I have not provided the names of my respondents.  I have, however, included footnotes 
identifying the official position of the speaker and the dates on which the interview took place. 
8 Using what social scientists call “open-ended, semi-structured” field interviews, I sought to ascertain how rules, 
regulations, and a variety of normative constraints influence the design and execution of undercover investigations.   
My interviews focused on the personal experiences of those who participate in, supervise, and evaluate undercover 
operations.  There are a number of options for gathering this kind of data.  See Yvonna S. Lincoln & Egon Guba, 
Naturalistic Inquiry, (1985); Gary King, Robert O. Keohane & Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, (1994); 
Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods,  2nd ed. (1980); David Flinders & Geoffrey 
E. Mills, Theory and Concepts in Qualitative Research, (1993).   
9 Koriath, Kriminalistik 1992, 727. 
7
understandings of what makes undercover policing a “necessary evil.”  The essay concludes by 
examining the influence of German Reunification – and ensuing debates about divided  loyalties 
-- on the controversy surrounding undercover policing.   
 
II.  The Troubled Legitimacy of Undercover Policing in Germany 
 
In Germany, much more than in the United States, undercover police investigations have 
long occupied a legally ambiguous position.  German undercover operations are the province not 
only of the police but also of the country’s seventeen domestic intelligence agencies (the Federal 
Agency for the Protection of the Constitution (APC) and its counterpart agencies within each of 
the sixteen German states.)  Strictly separated from the police since its creation in 1949, the 
APCs were given no powers of arrest or interrogation and were therefore also exempted from the 
so-called principle of legality, which requires law enforcement authorities to investigate and 
prosecute all crimes on a non discretionary basis.  (The police, in turn, were prohibited from 
gathering intelligence.)10 The APCs’ exemption from the principle of legality meant that they 
could countenance a certain degree of law breaking by their own operatives and by those whom 
they investigated without being forced to take action.  In a very real sense, then, the APCs’ 
infiltrators did not have to “play by the rules” of the criminal law that applied to the rest of 
society.  When undercover techniques began to filter into the Federal Republic’s police practices 
in the 1970s and 80s, it remained an open question for many whether covert tactics could be 
reconciled with the principle of legality, and indeed with the rule of law —despite the fact that 
this technique was now being used against drug traffickers and other ordinary criminals.11 
Scholars and judges gave voice to these doubts by cataloging a wide array of faults.   
Among these was a concern that undercover policing violated the principle of separation 
between police and intelligence agencies by permitting the police to use undercover operations 
as a form of domestic espionage.12 This was a particularly sensitive point for Germany, because 
the principle had been introduced in 1949 as a means of avoiding dangerous concentrations of 
powers like those possessed by the Gestapo.13 Coercive law enforcement powers, including 
arrest powers, were withheld from intelligence agencies and the police were prohibited from 
gathering intelligence.  Critics feared that undercover policing would erode the functional 
distinction between police work and intelligence gathering by allowing the police to collect 
intelligence in the guise of gathering evidence.14 The association of undercover policing with the 
work of domestic intelligence agencies was a particular concern  because of occasional scandals 
about APC infiltrators steering right-wing extremist groups and because the APC is not bound by 
the principle of legality (which prohibits the police from tolerating law-breaking.)  The more 
 
10 The principle of separation is not written into the Constitution; it derives from an Allied directive issued by letter 
on April 4, 1949, in which the Allied military governors indicated that they could approved the FRG’s Basic Law 
only subject to the requirement that the functions of police powers and intelligence agencies be strictly separated.  
See e.g.  Roewer, DVerwBl. 1986 (205).. 
11 See e.g. Karl Luederssen, V-Leute: Die Falle im Rechtsstaat  (1985)(an anthology of essays on undercover 
policing in which many contributors gave voice to such doubts.) 
12 Roewer, DVerwBl 205 (1986); Hetzer, ZRP 19 (1999); Riegel, ZRP 216 (1999); Schaefer, NJW 2572 (1999); 
Gusy, ZRP 45 (1987); Lisken, NJW 1482 (1982); Gusy, GA 319 (1999); Roewer, DVBl 666 (1988); Kutscha, ZRP 
194 (1986); Lisken, ZRP 264 (1994) .  
13 See note 12 above. 
14 Id. 
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covert practices seemed to resemble the work of intelligence agencies, the more doubts were 
raised about undercover policing’s compatibility with the principles of legality and separation.  
Critics did not want the police to have the discretion to pursue some crimes and tolerate others in 
the fashion of intelligence agencies.  
 
But commentators worried about undercover policing for many other reasons.  Germany 
distinguishes police work designed to prevent crimes that have not yet happened (“preventive 
operations”) from attempts to solve crimes that have already occurred (“repressive operations.”)   
State laws govern the former; federal law governs the latter.   The police may conduct 
undercover investigations in either capacity. This gives rise to concerns that the police may 
disguise one kind of operation as another to shop for a more favorable regulatory context.  
Critics of covert policing also take infiltration to task for its tendency to involve undercover 
agents and informants in the commission of crimes.15 Moreover, undercover policing seemed to 
expose suspects to undue pressures and temptations that were inconsistent with the prohibition 
on entrapment.16 
Police infiltration also seemed to violate constitutional protections of privacy and 
autonomy—so-called “rights of personality,” which protect “the freedom to realize one’s 
potential as an individual,” or “freedom in the creation of the self.”17 These worries intensified 
after Germany’s Constitutional High Court held that the government’s collection and processing 
of census data had to respect a newly recognized constitutional right of “informational self-
determination,” that is, a right of every citizen to know what information the government has 
collected about her and to control the use, storage, and transmission of the data.18 The new legal 
construct was a hybrid of dignity and of privacy interests protected by the “law of personality.” It 
can be understood as an expression of what James Whitman has described as a continental 
conception of “privacy as an aspect of [personal] dignity,” as distinct from the U.S. conception 
of privacy as “an aspect of liberty.”19 Whitman traces continental and particularly French and 
German conceptions of privacy to a concern with protecting personal dignity and honor by 
safeguarding the “capacity to control presentation of self,” that is, the face one presents to 
others.20 
The German legal system diverges from U.S. Supreme Court doctrine by assuming that 
people do not completely surrender privacy expectations when they impart information to 
 
15 Patric Makrutzki, Verdeckte Ermittlungen im Strafprozess, (1999); Otto, JuS 1982; Sk-StGB, at Section 26 n.3; 
Holger Nitz, Einsatzbedingte Straftaten Verdeckter Ermittler (1997); Koriath, Kriminalistik 1992, 727; Hilger, NstZ 
1992, 525; Krey, Rechtsprobleme des strafprozessualen Einsatzes Verdeckter Ermittler, 1993; Hund, NStZ 1993, 
572; Amelung, JuS 1986, 333;  Rogall JuS 1992, 558; Erfurth, Verdeckte Ermittlungen, 1996, Schwarzburg NStZ 
1995,470; Stuemper, Kriminalistik, 1994, 192. 
16 Karl Luederssen, V-Leute: Die Falle im Rechtsstaat  (1985);  Kempf, StV 1999, 128; Weiler, GA 1994, 561, 
Bruns, NStZ 1983, 49; Sommer, NStZ 1999, 48, Kinzig, StV 1999, 288, Stock/Kreuzer, Drogen und Polizei, 1996, 
Franzheim, NJW 1979, 2015; Seier/Schlehofer, JuS 1983, 52, Taschke, StV 1984, 178.  
17 Duttge, JZ 1996, 556; Markus Deutsch, Die heimliche Erhebung von Informationen und deren Aufbewahrung 
durch die Polizei,  1992;  Lammer, Verdeckte Ermittlungen im Strafprozess, 1992; Creutz, ZRP 1988, 415; Busch, 
DOeV 1984, 161; Degenhart, JuS 1992, 361; Kunig, JURA 1993, 595;  Hund, StV 1993, 379; Fezer JZ 1995, 972.  
18 BVerfGE 65, 1, NJW 1984, 419.  
19 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 Yale L. J. 1151 (2004). 
20 Id.   .
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others.21 Nor do people necessarily forfeit their privacy interests by “exposing” themselves to 
the public.  They enjoy privacy protections even when appearing naked in public.  As Whitman 
points out, naked sunbathers in German parks have the right to suppress the publication of nude 
photographs of themselves taken in public.22 Indeed, German law requires advance judicial 
authorization of long-term visual surveillance even when conducted entirely in public areas.23 
Such surveillance may infringe “informational self-determination” rights by allowing the 
government to construct a comprehensive record of a person’s doings and habits.   
 
What matters to the privacy inquiry in Germany is the personal nature and extensiveness 
of the information the government collects, not where observation takes place.  Accordingly, 
undercover investigations may infringe rights to determine what information one wishes to 
impart to the world—unless the government has afforded targets adequate protection by 
regulating the conditions of surveillance.24 Covert operations enable the government to chart a 
person’s intimate associations and infringe dignity by deceiving him into building relationships 
of trust on false pretenses.  Such concerns explain why Germany, unlike the United States, 
eventually reformed its system to provide at least as much protection against intrusive, long-term 
undercover investigations as it does against wiretaps.  Once protections for dignity and personal 
relationships are factored into the analysis, undercover policing is arguably the more intrusive of 
the two modes of investigation, since it injects infiltrators into the target’s personal realm.   
 
By contrast, American law affords much less protection to “informational privacy.”  It 
concentrates on upholding “physical privacy” in the home and “decisional privacy,” such as the 
right to be free from government interference when deciding about birth control and abortion.25 
Consistent with American downplaying of “informational privacy” and emphasis on “decisional 
privacy,” American regulation of undercover policing places heavy emphasis on entrapment 
doctrine, which may be viewed as restraining the government from interfering with a target’s 
autonomy through undue inducements or pressure.26 
Undercover policing raises less alarm in the United States than in Germany.  This is not 
only because of different attitudes toward privacy, but also because of the special evidentiary 
 
21 Indeed, there are other areas in which German law protects the “unfolding” of personality through intimate 
associations, for example by extending testimonial privileges so that not only fiancés but even aunts and cousins do 
not have to testify against relatives in criminal proceedings. “Sedlmayr case,” BVerfG, JR 2000, 333.  By contrast, 
the U.S. Supreme Court holds that offenders assume the risk of betrayal by their associates, including the danger that 
such associates will turn out to be informants or undercover agents. Hoffa v.United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 
(1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990).  
22 See Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, note 23 above. 
23 St PO 163f. 
24 These regulations include restrictions on the kinds of crimes that warrant invasive tactics of this sort, the need to 
explain why less intrusive tactics will not suffice, and procedural requirements such as the need to obtain advance 
prosecutorial and sometimes judicial authorization, and to notify targets of the intrusion after the fact (when this is 
feasible.)  
25 See Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, note 23 above.  For the distinction 
between “informational,” “decisional,” and “physical” privacy, see William A. Edmundsen, Privacy, in  Blackwell’s 
Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson, eds. (1988). 
26 Sorrells  v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932) (defining entrapment as “the instigation by government 
officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish 
them.”); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)(same). 
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advantages that covert operations provide in an adversarial criminal process.  “Undercover 
operations permit us to prove our cases with direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence.  
Instead of having to rely on…testimony of unsavory criminals and confidence men…credible 
law enforcement agents, often augmented by unimpeachable video and oral taps…[make it 
possible to] avoid[ ] issues of mistaken identity or perjurious efforts by a witness to implicate an 
innocent person.”27 And while regular policing strategies disproportionately catch the poorest 
and least sophisticated criminals, infiltration provides access to the misdeeds of well-insulated 
elites.  During one famous undercover investigation, Operation Greylord, “undercover agents 
were able to record hundreds of incriminating conversations with judges and attorneys which 
revealed that judges routinely accepted bribes to dismiss cases and received kickbacks from 
attorneys for assigning cases to them.”28 
American undercover operations ultimately produce evidence introduced at trial through 
the testimony of covert agents.  This testimony is often supported by video and audio recordings. 
In Germany, however, there is no cathartic courtroom confrontation between undercover agents 
and defendants; no valorization of infiltrator’s  exploits before a rapt jury; and no prospect that 
cross-examination will require agents to confront and explain dubious conduct on their part.  
German undercover agents do not testify.  Agents transmit information through the testimony of 
their control officers. Because the agents’ identity and role must remain secret for much of their 
career, they are more hesitant to record their meetings with targets.  Thus German trials do not 
provide the same ringside seat to criminal activities as the American sound-and-light show, in 
which live witnesses dramatize encounters with “bad guys” on video and audio, and in court.  
German undercover agents do, of course, obtain “inside access” and “inside information.”  But 
how they obtained it, and how they affected the events they observed, remains obscure, and 
therefore, to some extent, suspect.29 
To be sure, covert operations in the United States are hardly unproblematic.  “Even when 
used by law enforcement officials with the most honorable motives and the greatest integrity, the 
undercover technique may on occasion create crime where none would otherwise have 
existed.”30 The FBI Guidelines themselves acknowledge that “these techniques inherently 
involve an element of deception and may require cooperation with persons whose motivation and 
conduct are open to question.”31 But the American undercover policing system rests on the 
assumption that the heterogeneous harms which undercover policing imposes may be traded off 
against sufficient investigative gains. Despite misgivings about the compromises involved, the 
U.S. allows undercover operations to be authorized without legislative action; without advance 
judicial approval; without probable cause (or even reasonable suspicion); and without a finding 
that less intrusive tactics were inadequate.   
 
27 House Judiciary Committee Hearing on FBI Undercover Guidelines (1981) (statement of Philip B. Heymann, 
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). 
28 OIG Report at 139.  
29 The denial of confrontation rights gave rise to challenges to covert practices as inconsistent with the trial rights of 
criminal defendants, not only under the Germany constitution but under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
creating conflict with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which strongly disapproved of the 
use of secret evidence and anonymous witnesses. 
30 OIG Report at 140-141. 
31 OIG Report at 140. 
11
These accommodations indicate that, however intrinsically troubling it may be, 
undercover policing simply does not pose the same challenges to the values and norms of the 
United States legal system as it does to those of Germany.  The United States recognizes no 
principle of legality; no comparable separation between the pursuit of evidence and domestic 
intelligence; no categorical prohibition on agents or informants committing crimes undercover; 
and no important legal distinction between preventive and crime-solving stings.   Accordingly, 
covert policing encounters very different problems of legitimacy in Germany and the United 
States.   The contrast between  these systems’ background values and demands shape what they 
mean, and how they differ, in regarding undercover policing as a necessary evil.   
 
Undercover policing, then, required a unique set of compromises in Germany, and the 
Bundestag effectuated these in 1992, through a sweeping set of legal and institutional reforms. 
Before this point, covert policing had been relatively unbounded.  There had been far less 
regulation of undercover operations than of overt, coercive policing.  Undercover operations had 
been regulated, in part, through what I will term “substantive norms.”  These norms prohibited 
undercover agents and informants from committing crimes or excessively encouraging others to 
do so.32 These prohibitions were backed up by the principle of legality, which made criminal 
prosecution mandatory in most cases, even when the police violated the law for investigative 
purposes. The principle of legality also constrained covert tactics by prohibiting the police from 
tolerating law-breaking by targets.33 And undercover policing was regulated through guidelines 
issued jointly by state ministries of justice and the interior. 34 The guidelines imposed few limits 
on the types of crimes that agents could target and offered little guidance for how covert 
operations should be conducted.   
 
These various models of regulating undercover policing seemed inadequate.  The secrecy 
surrounding both the practice and regulation of covert operations, along with the eruption of 
occasional scandals, made it difficult to defend against claims that undercover policing required 
tighter and more public controls.  Without checks and balances on the initiation of undercover 
investigations, decisions about whom to target, for what reasons, and how, were largely entrusted 
to the police.  Given the scant outside supervision of undercover operations, and given their 
secrecy, it was difficult to ensure consistency in police practices and to correct mistakes.    
 
The centrality of legislation to reform is not surprising, given that German judges and 
scholars associated the rule of law with the enactment of rules that formally regulated and 
circumscribed the powers of government officials, particularly the police.35 Legislation held the 
promise of resting covert operations on a more democratic foundation, controlling police 
discretion, and establishing clean boundaries for permitted practices.  Calls for legislative action 
 
32 These norms have been elaborated through judicial decisions and scholarly commentary.  Kempf, StV 1999, 128; 
Weiler, GA 1994, 561, Bruns, NStZ 1983, 49; Sommer, NStZ 1999, 48, Kinzig, StV 1999, 288, Stock/Kreuzer, 
Drogen und Polizei, 1996, Franzheim, NJW 1979, 2015; Seier/Schlehofer, JuS 1983, 52, Taschke, StV 1984, 178.  
33 St PO 152; 163. 
34 Gemeinsame Richtlinien der Justizminister/-senatoren und der Innenminister/-senatoren der Laender ueber die 
Inanspruchnahme von Informanten sowie ueber den Einsatz von Vertrauenspersonen (V-Personen) und Verdeckten 
Ermittlern im Rahmen der Strafverfolgung, 15 RiStBV Anl. D (first issued in 1985 and amended  in 1993 and 1994 
to accord with the 1992 statute.)   
35 See e.g. Karl Luederssen, V-Leute: Die Falle im Rechtsstaat  (1985);  Bruns, NStZ 1983, 49; Franzheim, NJW 
1979, 2015; Seier/Schlehofer, JuS 1983, 52, Taschke, StV 1984, 17. 
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also drew support from the European Court of Human Rights.36 It had begun to treat abuses of 
undercover policing as violations of the fair trial guarantee written into the European Convention 
on Human Rights.37 
Criticism from within the ranks of the German legal elite created a further need to 
legitimate undercover practices to the state’s own personnel.  The constituencies that pressed for 
reform included legal academics and judges, particularly the federal Supreme Court, which 
promoted fundamental rights by calling for legislation rather than by crafting standards of its 
own.38 Indeed, the ministries of the interior and justice, and the police themselves called for 
change in the undercover policing system.  But they concentrated particularly on the need to 
augment covert powers in order to deal with rising crime rates and, in particular, with organized 
crime.  Transnational crime increased with the integration of the European Union, the opening of 
borders, the reunification of Germany, and the ensuing dislocations.  Organized crime, 
particularly in its transnational dimension, became a focus of public attention, beginning in the 
1980s and continuing into the 1990s.  German police responded by championing covert methods 
as a useful counter-measure.39 They viewed undercover policing as essential for illuminating the 
hierarchical relationships, infrastructure, and division of labor that prevail in criminal 
organizations.40 
In 1992, the German Bundestag enacted legislation which sought both to legitimate 
undercover operations by addressing mounting constitutional concerns and to institutionalize 
such investigations as an indispensable weapon against organized crime.  The statute increased 
the range of the government’s covert powers, including telephone tapping and ambient electronic 
surveillance.  The statute also authorized undercover operations.  But it did so for the 
investigation only of serious crimes (such as drug and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, and the 
forgery of official documents) or offenses committed by career criminals or gangs.  The police 
could resort to undercover investigations only when it was very difficult to obtain evidence 
through other means.  The statute required advance prosecutorial approval if the investigation 
had not yet focused on particular suspects and advance judicial approval—a warrant—for any 
undercover operation that targeted specific persons or that required entry into private homes.41 
While imposing new constraints, however, the 1992 law also expanded and institutionalized 
covert policing by authorizing deep cover investigations in which agents lived undercover long 
term.  The reforms left intact the principle of legality and the “substantive norms” (against law-
breaking and entrapment.)  In sum, Germany responded piecemeal to the various anxieties about 
covert practices.  It melded disparate substantive and procedural norms rather than 
 
36 See note 4, supra. 
37 Id. 
38 Bernhard Schlink, German Constitutional Culture in Transition, in  Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and 
Legitimacy, Michel Rosenfeld, ed. (1994). 
39 See e.g. Volker Krey, Rechtsprobleme des strafprozessualen Einsatzes verdeckter Ermittler, (1993).
40 Schaefer, Kriminalistik 1997, 23; BT-Dr 12/989, Sieber, JZ 1995, 758; Gemeinsame Richtlinien der 
Justizminister/-senatoren und der Innenminister/-senatoren der Laender ueber die Zusammenarbeit von 
Staatsanwaltschaft und Polizei bei der Verfolgng der Organisierten Kriminalitaet, Kleinknecht/Meyer-Gossner, 15 
RiStBV Anl. E, Lisken, ZRP 1994, 264.  
41 That the owner voluntarily admitted an undercover agent into his home did not relieve agents of the obligation to 
obtain judicial approval in advance, assuming that the need for meeting in a private apartment could be anticipated.. 
BGH 1997, NStZ 1997. 448; Roxin, StV 1998, 43. 
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comprehensively addressing all controversial facets of undercover policing.  The interaction 
among these different legal norms would prove problematic. 
 
III. Assessing the Legitimacy of Undercover Policing in Germany: A Model of 
Legitimacy-as-Fit  
 
Germany’s reform of undercover policing was in part motivated by a desire to increase 
the legitimacy of covert operations.  What sense(s) of legitimacy were at stake in this endeavor?  
What sense(s) of legitimacy can be used to evaluate the post-1992 German system? 
 
Legitimacy, of course, has many meanings.  At the outset, I will lay out two senses of the 
concept that are popular in the scholarly literature but not valuable for understanding undercover 
policing.  Then I will sketch out the approach I will use.  First, legitimacy can refer to citizens’ 
belief that the orders of authorities deserve their obedience, as manifested by a disposition to 
submit to commands independently of sanctions and rewards.42 Critics of this approach—often 
termed the “sociological conception” of legitimacy—note that it is difficult to disentangle 
compliance with a legal order because of its perceived legitimacy from compliance based on 
habit and self-interest.43 More particularly, the sociological conception of legitimacy has little 
utility analyzing undercover policing,  which employs subterfuge and makes no demands on the 
obedience of the deceived.   
 
Second, legitimacy could refer to public acceptance of undercover policing, or of the 
laws that regulate it, or of the overall legal system in which such practices are embedded.44 There 
are reasons to be skeptical of such an approach.  To begin with, it centers on the beliefs of the 
general public.  Debates about the legitimacy of the covert policing system have largely been 
conducted among the legal elites (who have pressed for reform) and among Interior Ministry and 
police officials (who seek the security of clear-cut rules and warrants to bless their efforts in 
advance.) The public’s beliefs about the legitimacy of the undercover policing system may lack 
much content when the average person knows relatively little about the overall legal system or 
the powers and doings of undercover agents.45 
To evaluate the German undercover policing system, I will employ a particular 
understanding of legitimacy that I will term “legitimacy-as-fit.”  This understanding is rooted in 
David Beetham’s model of legitimacy, but then is augmented and adapted to be useful in my 
particular context of undercover policing.46 Section III will first explain Beetham’s model, then 
 
42 This approach was famously articulated by Max Weber; see e.g.  1 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline 
of Interpretive Sociology 31 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).   See also Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 40, 
1986 (“an authority is accepted as legitimate if its instructions are accepted as a reason for conforming action”). 
43 See Alan Hyde, supra, note __; Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, (1990); Roger Cotterell, 
Law’s Community, (1995).
44 This variant of the sociological conception discussed above distinguishes “order legitimation” from “norm 
legitimation.”  For a critique of both, see Hyde, supra,note 48.   
45 For a discussion of the difficulties involved in using public attitudes to gage the legitimacy of institutions, see 
Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787 (2005); Alan Hyde, The Concept of 
Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wisconsin L. Rev. 379. 
46 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (1991). 
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set forth my concept of “legitimacy-as-fit,” and, finally, explore how my understanding of 
legitimacy helps assess the peculiar practices and challenges of covert policing. 
 
Beetham’s definition of legitimacy blends normative and descriptive approaches to the 
concept.47 For Beetham, institutions, laws, or legal orders are legitimate to the extent (1) power 
is obtained and exercised in accordance with the legal rules for doing so; (2) laws and institutions 
are consistent with society’s higher-order values, interests, and normative expectations; and (3) 
there is meaningful evidence of consent derived not merely from acquiescence but from 
affirmative expressions of agreement (such as the vote of a legislature in a democracy.)48 
The three prongs of Beetham’s model suggest some of the ways a policing system may 
not be legitimate. The first prong usefully captures doubts about whether police, prosecutors and 
judges actually “play by the rules” of the system and whether the system adequately constrains 
their discretion.  The second prong of the definition highlights fears about the consistency of 
undercover policing with constitutional protections for privacy, trial rights, proscriptions on 
deceptive interrogation, the principle of legality, and prohibitions on entrapment and law-
breaking by undercover agents.  The third dimension of legitimacy captures concerns about the 
absence of democratically enacted enabling legislation authorizing and regulating particular 
police practices. 
 
Beetham’s concept of legitimacy is descriptive in that it depends on empirical inquiry 
into the values that participants in the criminal justice system expect that system to 
accommodate.  It tests the system against higher-level norms that it derives from the legal and 
political culture particular to a given society rather than from political or moral theory in the 
abstract.  But it also has an evaluative component.  It does not ask merely whether law 
enforcement personnel believe that the criminal justice system conforms to society’s higher-level 
values.  It asks whether the system in fact does.  What critics and defenders believe can of course 
provide powerful evidence that the system conforms to society’s values and expectations.  But 
legitimacy is not primarily about public relations. 
 
I will set out a number of criteria that may assist in evaluating the legitimacy of German 
undercover policing along the first two of Beetham’s three dimensions (namely, legal validity 
and norm congruence.)  I will term this augmented version of Beetham’s model, as applied to the 
particular challenges of German undercover policing, “legitimacy-as-fit.”  For the sake of 
expository clarity, I will organize my discussion according to the prongs of Beetham’s model 
introduced earlier, focusing particularly on:   
 
(a) Legal Validity
47 For a discussion of the distinction between varieties of descriptive and normative conceptions of legitimacy, see 
John H. Schaar, Legitimacy in the Modern State, in Legitimacy and the State, William Connolly, ed. (1984); Richard 
H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787 (2005).   For a critical survey of varieties of 
political (normative) theories of legitimacy, see Richard Warner, Adjudication and Legal Reasoning, in The 
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundsen, eds. 
(1988).   
48 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (1991). 
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What features of a legal system encourage compliance with the system’s rules?  First, 
actors in the system have to know their obligations.  The system has to spell out the difference 
between permissible and forbidden conduct in a coherent fashion.49 Actors must be reasonably 
able to behave according to the rules of the system.  In this way, a regulatory system can, ideally, 
assess legitimacy according to technical criteria, including the degree of adherence to proper 
procedures (e.g. did the agent get a warrant?)50 Second, a legal system must limit discretionary 
power, institute checks and balances, and respect the separation of powers, e.g. between police 
and intelligence agencies.51 
(b)  Congruence with Norms
Beetham argues that a legal system enjoys greater legitimacy the more it tracks a 
society’s higher-order values and norms.  The German undercover policing system’s consistency 
with higher-order values depends in part on the adequacy of procedural safeguards for privacy 
and other fundamental rights.  It also depends on the way in which the regulatory regime 
implements the principle of legality and on the extent to which it promotes adherence to 
substantive norms prohibiting entrapment and law-breaking.   Legitimacy diminishes to the 
extent to which the system as implemented requires police, prosecutors, and judges to reduce the 
force of these constraints, transform their meaning, or limit their scope.  As I shall argue, the 
undercover policing system not only permits but depends on these accommodations.  Finally, 
congruence with norms also requires the regulated practices to serve the ends for which they 
were legitimated—such as fighting organized crime—as judged by criteria not “wholly in the 
control” of interested parties (such as the police.)52 
My account of legitimacy-as-fit suggests different ways in which undercover policing 
meets or fails to meet the demands placed upon it by the wider legal system and by society.  This 
model makes it possible to classify problems of legitimacy according to the dimension along 
which the system falls short.  The participants in the German debate about undercover policing 
do not themselves use the theory of “legitimacy as fit” that I have developed above.  Depending 
on their institutional position and interests, they draw on selected concerns about legitimacy that 
are components of the legitimacy-as-fit model.  Their perspective is not alien to the model, but 
partial.  I will tack back and forth between the theory of legitimacy-as-fit and the various 
(contested) understandings of legitimacy that actors in Germany’s legal system deploy.  From 
time to time, I will also contrast German and American undercover policing in order to explore 
why the American regulatory approach is so much less self-conscious and contested and why the 
countries legitimate covert practices so differently.   
 
49 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights  (1980); Robert Grafstein, The Legitimacy of Political 
Institutions,14 Polity 51 (1981); see also Roger Cotterell’s discussion of legal closure in Law’s Community, at 91-
110. 
50 For a discussion of legal closure as an element of legitimacy, see Roger Cotterell, Law’s Community, (1995).  
51 James O. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative process and American government (1978).  
Beethem himself emphasizes checks and balances and separation of powers  as vital for compliance with rules.  
Beetham, The Legitimatino of Power,  supra, at 123.  
52 Willard Hurst, The Leigitmacy of the Business Corporation, 1970)(emphasizing the importance of independent 
performance measures to the legitimacy of institutions.) 
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IV. Reform and the New Respectability of Undercover Policing  
 
The 1992 statute’s procedural controls legitimated the evidence that deep cover agents 
produced as having been obtained in a properly authorized way.  The judicial approval 
requirements made admissibility relatively unproblematic once the trial court had answered  
handful of straightforward questions.  Had the government’s application for approval set forth 
one of the enumerated predicate offenses?  Had it explained why conventional (non covert) 
investigative tactics would not yield equivalent results?  Precisely by making the criteria for 
approval largely formal, the statute made it easy for courts to decide whether undercover 
investigations were lawful. The trial judge might not know whether an undercover agent had 
exerted improper pressure on his target.  But the judge could easily determine whether the crime 
being investigated was a predicate offense.   
 
By promoting the routine acceptance of evidence obtained undercover, the reforms also 
legitimated the already established trial practice of using hearsay evidence as a substitute for the 
live testimony of undercover agents.53 (This of course limits the opportunities for testing the 
reliability of undercover agents’ testimony.)  Once courts recognized deep cover operations as 
legitimate, they also accepted the need to protect deep cover agents’ elaborately constructed false 
identities by preventing defendants from tracing the source of the evidence presented at trial.54 
The agent “testifies” through his control officer, who relates the agent’s observations and 
conversations with targets, or through the admission of written answers to questions posed to the 
agent by his control officer, the court, or defense counsel.55 
Gary Marx has argued that “undercover work is ethical when the decision to use it has 
been publicly announced.”56 The enactment of the statutory reforms legitimated covert 
investigations—suggesting “democratic consent,” along the third axis of Beetham’s model of 
legitimacy--by publicly settling their legal status, and giving fair notice of the circumstances 
under which they could be authorized.  But the 1992 reform not only authorized existing covert 
practices but laid the groundwork for expanding the use of deep cover operations.  It provided 
that undercover agents could operate under assumed identities long–term, use forged documents 
like birth certificates and passports, and enter into apartment and auto leases, cell-phone 
contracts, employment relationships and other legal arrangements in their undercover capacity.57 
The 1992 statute transformed covert investigations from what they had been in the heyday of 
U.S.-German cooperation in the “war against drugs” (in the 1980’s)—an engine of “buy-busts” 
and quick “stats”58—into a sophisticated tool for  unveiling the structures, hierarchies, assets, 
client relationships, and transport routes of organized crime.   Since covert powers were now a 
creature of statute, this expansion of covert practices gained legitimacy from democratic 
authorization.     
 
53 Annette von Stetten, Beweisverwertung beim Einsatz Verdeckter Ermittler  (2000). 
54 St PO 96. 
55 BVerfG NJS 1981, 1719. St PO 251 II. 
56 Gary T. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America, 95 (1988).   
57 The contractual powers of undercover agents are never questioned in the United States, which imposes fewer 
constraints on the use of aliases even by private citizens. 
58 For an account of DEA influence on covert policing in Europe during the height of American and European 
cooperation against drug traffickers, in the 1980s see Ethan Nadelmann, The DEA in Europe, in Undercover: Police 
Surveillance in Comparative Perspective, Cyrille Fijnaut and Gary T. Marx, eds. (Kluwer, 1995). 
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The 1992 reforms also justified these new powers by establishing protection for 
fundamental rights, including the right to control the government’s access to personal 
information, and the right to privacy in the home.59 (This made deep cover practices more 
consonant with constitutional privacy norms, along the second axis of legitimacy-as-fit.) The 
statute protected fundamental rights through its warrant procedure; by restricting deep cover 
operations to serious offenses; and by requiring a showing of necessity.  Notification 
requirements and suppression remedies provided targets some protection after an investigation 
concluded.  These statute imposed thus imposed procedural controls that paralleled the 
requirements for telephone wiretaps—and the parallelism with an accepted investigative method 
helped to legitimate undercover policing.   
 
Moreover, the procedural requirements of the 1992 statute satisfied many of the formal 
criteria laid out in the legitimacy-as-fit test.  They were prospective and clear, and relatively 
simple to apply, and they provided the police, prosecutors and judges with guidance as to what 
was expected.60 The statute made it possible to present the undercover policing system as 
internally coherent and capable of reconciling fairness with crime control.   
 
The new system also sought to disarm claims that deep cover operations usurp the 
prerogatives of intelligence agencies in violation of the constitutional mandate to separate law-
enforcement from intelligence functions—another problem for congruence with higher-order 
norms.  Deep cover investigations are intrinsically vulnerable to the charge that they blur the line 
between collecting intelligence and gathering evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.  They 
aim to uncover structures, hierarchies, and power relationships within criminal organizations—
information with uncertain evidentiary payoff, particularly in Germany, where the criminal law 
provides few options for charging organized crime as such.61 
The German system now clearly distinguishes between, on one hand, undercover 
operations designed to gather evidence against particular targets (“repressive” investigations) 
and, on the other hand, operations designed to maintain order in the community (“preventive” 
investigations).  German police can conduct undercover investigations in either their preventive 
or repressive capacities.62 One way the new system has legitimated undercover operations is by 
protecting undercover investigations that collect evidence for a criminal prosecution from the 
charge of being too much like preventive undercover investigations, which have long been 
criticized as eroding the principle of separation between preventive and repressive policing, and 
between intelligence and police work.63 The 1992 authorized deep cover repressive operations 
 
59 Duttge, JZ 1996, 556. 
60 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights  (1980); Robert Grafstein, The Legitimacy of Political 
Institutions,14 Polity 51 (1981); see also Roger Cotterell’s discussion of legal closure in Law’s Community, at 91-
110. 
61 “Criminal association,” defined by St GB 129, remains the only official organized crime offense, though the 1992 
statute enacted aggravating factors to boost the penalties for other, more ordinary crimes.  
62 Indeed, the U.S. legal system folds much of this concern with “public threats” and order-maintenance into its 
administration of the criminal laws; see Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the end 
of Criminal Law, 91 J. Crim. Law and Criminology 829 (2001). 
63 See Heiner Busch and Albrecht Funk, Undercover Tactics as an Element of Preventive Crime Fighting in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, in Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective Gary T. Marx & Cyrille Fijnaut 
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as sources of evidence.  This sharpened the demarcation from preventive undercover operations  
and protected repressive investigations from the taint of  “merely gathering intelligence.”64 
American criminal procedure does not require that the police request arrest warrants, 
search warrants, or wiretap orders as soon as probable cause can be established.  If German 
courts scrutinized the factual basis for the application to authorize an undercover operation as 
closely as American trial judges (are supposed to) scrutinize probable cause, they would put the 
police and prosecutors in a difficult position.  On the one hand, the police would want to put off 
the request until the application was sufficiently airtight to survive later scrutiny for its factual 
adequacy.  On the other hand, if a court found that they had waited too long to apply for judicial 
authorization—that they had not sought authorization at the earliest possible moment--the court 
would usually have to suppress the evidence.65 The point of the German preapproval requirement 
was not to keep the police from conducting undercover investigations per se, since the police 
could do so in their preventive capacities.  Rather, the preapproval requirement was intended to 
encourage the police to turn preventive into repressive undercover probes (and to seek judicial 
approval) as soon as police suspicion had focused on particular targets. 
 
And police and prosecutors suggested that the statute has had this desired effect.  Police 
officials claim that they much prefer to conduct undercover probes repressively, or to move from 
the preventive to the repressive phase as soon as possible.66 They understand that by waiting too 
long to ask for judicial approval, they risk a judicial finding that they circumvented the 
requirements of the repressive statute, which would lead to suppression of the evidence.  
“Judicial approval is almost never denied; and once you have it, you know that you’re safe; the 
evidence is coming in.  And for most preventive operations, our ultimate aim is repressive.  So 
why not protect the fruit of your labors?”67 Judges agreed with this: “The police love this statute.  
It tells them what is necessary to get the approval, and then it shifts all the responsibility to us.”68 
“If there’s a judicial order, the evidence from the sting is almost always usable, barring some 
glaring illegality.”69 
The 1992 reforms also gained credibility from the contrast with what Germans viewed as 
largely unfettered American practices.70 Numerous German police officers and prosecutors 
asserted that “our covert agents are not undercover agents in the American sense.  American 
undercover agents have to live in the criminal milieu, and stay there indefinitely, and sell drugs 
and take part in thefts.”71 A German police official who worked with American operatives in 
Europe throughout the 1980s stated: “Those were the days of the Wild West.  We bought drugs 
 
eds. (1995); see also note 14 above. Unlike Germany’s intelligence agencies, the police enjoy no exemption from 
the principle of legality when they operate in their preventive guise.   
64 The undercover policing provisions became Section 110 of the St PO, the federal Code of Criminal Procedure, 
and thus legitimated undercover operations specifically as a tool for the acquisition of evidence for criminal 
prosecution. 
65 Maul StraFo 1997, 40; Nitz JR 1998, 213; Meyer-Gossner, St PO Kommentar, 110b 11. 
66 Interview with supervisor of German covert policing unit, May 19, 2003. 
67 Interview with German prosecutor, May 21, 2003. 
68 Interview of judges who review applications for undercover investigations, May 27, 2003. 
69 Id. 
70 Meyer-Gossner, St PO Kommentar,  110a 4; Krey VE 12; Kreuzer Schreiber-GS 225. 
71 Interview of German police official (former undercover agent), May 14, 2004. 
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in enormous quantities.  We didn’t worry about meeting with targets in their homes.  We 
operated like an intelligence service.  And entrapment?  Who cared about that?  In those days we 
all went over a little to the other side.  It went so far that when they passed the new law, they had 
to rename us.  We weren’t undercover agents anymore, which is what we had always called 
ourselves before, using the American term.  Now we became covert agents.”72 
Germany combined legal with administrative reforms in the German police. These 
changes improved legitimacy by institutionalizing infiltration as a craft and establishing separate, 
professional identities for covert units and their operatives.  Since the new German system 
explicitly permitted long-term deployment of deep cover operatives with false identities, police 
agencies have created new units specifically devoted to managing covert personnel.  The police 
aimed to legitimate undercover work by professionalizing and thus better controlling covert 
agents.  Germany improved recruitment and training of agents who were selected for deep cover 
assignments and of the control officers who were responsible for deep cover agents and 
informants. German undercover agents had to commit to undercover policing as a long-term 
(seven to ten-year) career path.  Because covert units have been separated from investigative 
divisions, they are freer to examine critically the assumptions of investigative agents about the 
seriousness of a crime and the depths of the targets’ involvement in the suspected criminal 
activities.   
Differentiating the functions of undercover agents, control officers, and informant 
handlers may also permit members of covert policing units to act as a check on each other.  
Professionalizing recruitment and training improves the likelihood that covert operatives will 
comply with the rules that govern their behavior, thereby promoting the legal validity and rule-
boundedness of the system, along the first dimension of legitimacy-as-fit.  At the same time, 
however, professional autonomy creates new barriers to oversight that may pose hazards of their 
own.     
 
These institutional reforms were made possible by statutory controls which regularized 
deep cover investigations and set out the legal prerequisites for their validity.  And statutory 
regulation occurs in a venue where the diffuse harms of undercover policing—particularly third 
party harms—can receive due consideration.  By contrast, such harms may escape notice in the 
American regulatory system, which focuses largely on the blameworthiness of individual targets 
and depends on legal challenges brought mainly by those who succumb to the government’s 
temptations.     
 
American regulation of undercover policing has been less attentive than Germany to the 
diffuse harms which such investigations can impose, largely because the United States does not 
regulate undercover policing through statutory controls.  To be sure, in the United States, 
undercover operations have periodically generated Congressional scrutiny and have occasionally 
called attention to the wider social impact of covert practices.  In 1982, the Senate established the 
Select Committee to Study Undercover Activities, in the wake of the controversy surrounding 
ABSCAM, an FBI corruption probe in which agents and informants disguised as wealthy Arabs 
attempted to bribe members of Congress without any prior indication that the targeted politicians 




undercover technique creates serious risks to citizens’ property, privacy, and civil liberties … 
and may on occasion create crime where none would otherwise have existedDuring 1983 and 
1984, Congress considered the Undercover Operations Act, which would have subjected federal 
undercover operations to congressional supervision, requiring a factual predicate of “reasonable 
suspicion” or “probable cause” for all undercover investigations.73 
But the bill was never brought to a vote. Instead, the Department of Justice enacted 
guidelines that govern the undercover operations of the DEA and FBI.   (Many police 
departments have adopted guidelines of their own.)74 Thus the United States now regulates 
covert practices through a combination of internal agency regulations; ethical rules for 
prosecutors (forbidding undercover contacts with represented defendants); and, most 
importantly, through defendants’ recourse to the entrapment defense.  (In extreme cases, 
involving “outrageous government conduct” that “shocks the conscience” of the court, 
defendants may also raise a constitutional objection under the Due Process Clause.)   
 
Department of Justice guidelines are not blind to the different ways in which undercover 
investigations may do harm.  The guidelines require the FBI to consider whether operations do 
“damage to public institutions through interference with political or administrative processes,” or 
pose risks to third parties, “such as financial loss or criminal victimization.”75 But because 
undercover operations are not treated as Fourth Amendment searches or seizures, American 
consideration of these larger societal costs is entrusted to the members of the executive, rather 
than to Congress or the judiciary (in contrast to electronic surveillance, which is regulated by 
Congressional statute and requires advance judicial authorization and a showing of probable 
cause.)  Unlike Germany, the United States does not circumscribe the types of offenses which 
may be investigated by intrusive, long-term infiltration, or require the government to notify 
targets of the investigation once it has been completed.   Nor do American regulations demand 
any showing of necessity (except insofar as investigators must satisfy the pragmatic concerns of 
the centralized review committee, which evaluates the cost-effectiveness of individual 
undercover operations in light of available alternatives.)   And in contrast to violations of 
Germany’s warrant procedure, an American agency’s failure to abide by governing regulations 
does not entitle targets to demand the suppression of evidence.   
 
Thus there is little outside check on the executive’s assessment of whether the societal 
costs of infiltration are high enough to preclude a covert investigation.  The only outside 
approval which investigative agencies must obtain is the approval of the United States Attorney 
for the relevant district, who must certify that the investigation involves “an appropriate use of 
the undercover technique, and that the potential benefits in detecting, preventing, or prosecuting 
criminal activity outweigh any direct costs or risks of other harm.”76 Concerns about privacy and 
fairness may enter into the cost-benefit calculus.   But the dominant framework for approving 
undercover tactics remains largely utilitarian and pragmatic.  (It is worth noting, however, that 
there are some ex-post controls on the system.  The FBI is subject to record-keeping and 
 
73 See Undercover Operations Act” Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 8 (1984).    
74 Hamilton and Smykla, Undercover Guidelines,  11 Justice Quarterlly No. 1, March 1994. 
75 Id. 
76 Undercover Guidelines Section IV F.2.b. 
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reporting requirements, and the Justice Department Office of the Inspector General conducts 
periodic audits of the FBI’s compliance with DOJ regulations.  The results of these internal 
assessments are publicly available and include detailed discussions of systemic strengths and 
weaknesses along with analyses of investigations that went awry.)77 
Accordingly, American regulation of undercover policing relies heavily on several 
mechanisms that restrain covert operations on a case-by-case basis without providing a system-
wide perspective.  First, consider the American entrapment doctrine.  Entrapment claims are only 
raised by targets interested in themselves and who have already “taken the bait”—which 
weakens their rhetorical, moral, and legal position (though it gives them “standing” to complain.)  
Second, American law provides third parties with remedies for torts arising from undercover 
activity.78 But these too depend on a fairly restrictive understanding of harm—not least because 
such lawsuits require identified victims (who must, moreover, know enough to trace their harm 
to its source.)  By contrast, Germany’s legislative approach requires lawmakers to address larger 
questions about the permissible scope of police powers in a democratic society and to consider 
the interests of targets and bystanders subject to undercover surveillance but never charged with 
an offense.   In particular, the German system required policymakers to consider the impact of 
deep cover investigations in general, and to create procedural protections for the entire category 
of such investigations.   The American mandate to take account of diffuse harms to third parties 
and lawful institutions applies to agency decisions about individual investigative proposals, on a 
case-by-case basis—not to the evaluation of undercover investigations as a whole, or to deep 
cover investigations as a subgroup.   
 
V.  The Limits of Regulation:  Why Dilemmas of Legitimacy Persist 
Section IV examined the ways in which covert policing reforms appeared to succeed in 
“taming” and thus legitimating undercover policing.  Section V challenges and complicates this 
“best case” scenario by examining ways in which the system, as implemented, conflicted with 
its legitimating norms. 
 
The 1992 statute and institutional reforms succeeded in meeting some of the objections to 
undercover policing per se, such as concerns about invasions of privacy or the use of deception..
The reforms that followed in its wake also made covert policing more acceptable to the legal 
establishment by making it more professional, establishing better mechanisms for supervision 
and oversight, and defining its objectives – the pursuit of evidence – in ways that seemed to 
distinguish covert policing from the work of intelligence agencies.   
 
But the reforms also perpetuated and intensified some of the old concerns about the 
legitimacy of covert tactics, while giving rise to new worries.  The reach of the statute was 
incomplete.  Some covert practices eluded it.  To critics, these looked like attempts to circumvent 
the law.  Criticisms previously leveled against undercover policing in general were redirected to 
 
77 See e.g. 2005 OIG Audit, supra. 
78 Possible causes of action include lawsuits brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401 and 2675 
(for damage to third parties and their property), and under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971)(for constitutional violations, such as illegal searches and seizures, which undercover agents commit 
when they intrude into private areas in ways that exceed the scope of their targets’ consent.) 
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these relatively unregulated operations.79 Nor could the system really separate the pursuit of 
intelligence from the collection of evidence.  Evidence-gathering operations could shelter the 
search for intelligence.  Deep cover operations also invited uncomfortable parallels with the 
work of the state and federal APCs, Germany’s domestic intelligence agencies. 
 
A.  The Incompleteness of Statutory Reform: Shallow Cover Agents and Informants 
 
The German statutory reforms are highly selective in the undercover operations they 
regulate.  As a result, they legitimate only a subset of covert investigations.  I will focus on three 
gaps in coverage.  First, the post-1992 system regulated undercover investigations run by the 
police, not those directed by the APCs.  (The APCs are responsible for investigating and 
infiltrating domestic (and more recently foreign) extremist organizations that threaten national 
security.80)
Second, the statute does not reach all covert operations of the police.  It addresses only 
those undercover investigations that the police undertake in their “repressive,” crime-solving 
capacity and that are designed to gather evidence of ongoing or past offenses.  Operations that 
the police undertake preventively to stop future crimes escape regulation under the 1992 statute.  
Accordingly, preventive operations could already be under way well before the police seek 
judicial approval to turn such investigations into (repressive) evidence-gathering stings. Instead, 
the 1992 statute regulated the procedure by which police would be permitted to transform 
relatively unfocused, preventive undercover investigations into to repressive operations aimed at 
gathering evidence against particular targets for use in criminal prosecutions.  By making little 
explicit provision for the evidentiary use of such information, the federal law created 
disincentives for continuing undercover operations as preventive investigations once suspicion 
had focused on particular targets.  Thus the statute could be said not to limit what sorts of 
undercover investigations the police could conduct—only what sorts of undercover 
investigations they could expect to mine for evidence in a criminal proceeding.   
 
There is a third way in which the system proved limited.  The German system regulates 
only those undercover operations that deploy deep cover agents for long-term investigations.  
The warrant requirement of the 1992 statute does not apply to undercover investigations using 
only informants or shallow cover agents.81 The application of the statute, and the need for 
judicial approval, depends to a large extent on whether the police decide to staff undercover 
investigations with unregulated shallow-cover agents in place of deep cover operatives.  This 
makes it possible for many covert operations to escape regulation under the statute.   
 
79 Duttge, JZ 1996, 556; Eschelbach, StV 2000, 390; Herrmann, Polizei-heute 2001, 151; Hetzer, KR 2001, 690; 
Kraushaar, KR 1995, 186; Lesch, JA 2000, 725; Roxin, StV 1998, 43; Krey, JR 1998,1; Meyer, KR 1999, 49; Nitz, 
JA 1999, 418; Schmidt, KR 2000, 162. 
80 See Marco Koenig, Trennung und Zusammenarbeit von Polizei und Nachrichtendiensten, (2005). 
81 These are called “non-overtly investigating agents” to distinguish them from “covert agents,” whom the statute is  
designed to regulate.  However, whether the statute applies to the activities of an undercover agent does not 
primarily depend on the choice of designation; rather, it depends on how many contacts the undercover agent has 
with his target, how deeply he delves into a criminal organization, the complexity and duration of the investigation, 
the number and intensity of contacts with third parties, and the extent to which it becomes necessary to conduct 
meetings in private residences, among other factors. 
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Distinguishing shallow- from deep-cover agents is no easy task, which further 
complicates regulation.   A federal appellate court has created a multi-factor test for determining 
when a shallow cover operative is the “functional equivalent” of a deep cover agent.82 The key 
factors include: the number of undercover meetings, the complexity of investigative tasks, 
whether it could be anticipated that the agent would have to enter private homes,  the length of 
time for which he is used, the number of people whom he must deceive about his identity, and 
whether the police expected him to testify.  No individual factor is dispositive.83 “Whether and 
when these [shallow cover agents] need judicial approval remains extremely unclear,” a police 
official complained.84 Some jurisdictions permitted two or three contacts; others up to ten or 
15.85 
It is precisely this perceived fungibility of undercover personnel that leads critics to argue 
that they should all be similarly constrained--shallow cover operatives, deep cover agents, and 
informants alike.86 Indeed, judges, lawyers, and politicians worry even more about informants 
than shallow cover agents.  Why, they ask, may informants be deployed to investigate crimes 
which are not serious enough to justify the use of deep cover agents?  Are informants not more in 
need of supervision?  Prompted by the post-1992 regulation of deep cover agents, these 
questions raised doubts about the legitimacy of using shallow cover agents and informants 
without equivalent statutory regulation.  It is significant, however, that these concerns have not 
led critics to question the nature of the statutory controls or the legitimacy of permitting deep 
cover operations at all.  Thus the post-1992 reforms have succeeded in diverting criticism away 
from the foundational assumptions of the system.  Instead, critics tend to call for an expansion of 
existing controls.   
 
B. Undercover Policing as a Source of Intelligence, Not Just Evidence 
 
1.   Intelligence-Gathering Before Judicial Authorization of Repressive Undercover 
Operations 
 
The greatest vulnerability of the post-1992 German regulatory system, however, is not its 
incomplete reach.  The greater challenge to the legitimacy of the system emerges from an 
internal tension.  On one hand, it tries to tame deep-cover investigations as evidence-gathering 
tactics; and on the other hand, it pushes undercover agents back into more shadowy intelligence-
gathering functions, that is, into gathering information not geared towards presentation in court.   
 
One reason for dynamic is that the search for evidence depends on the quality of advance 
intelligence.  Undercover investigations can only secure evidence if they have targeted the right 
suspects and identified their vulnerabilities and logistical needs (which an undercover agent can 
then offer to satisfy.)  These tasks require collecting intelligence through preventive undercover 
 
82 BGH, NJW 1996, 2100; BT-Dr 12/989; BGH 1 StR 527/96.  
83 BGH, NJW 1996, 2100; BT-Dr 12/989; BGH 1 StR 527/96. 
84 Interview with German chief of covert policing unit, June 2, 2003. 
85 Interviews with German prosecutor, May 10, 2004, March 12, 2004, May 13, 2004, and interview with German 
control officer of undercover agents, June 2, 2003. 
86 Duttge, JZ 1996 , 556; Eschelbach, StV 2000, 390; Hermann,  Polizei 2001, 151; Hetzer, Kriminalistik 2001, 691; 
Roxin, StV 98 , 43; Bernsmann/Jansen StV 98, 230; Fezer JZ 95, 972; Hund StV93, 380; Lagodny StV 96, 172. 
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operations.87 “We know, for example, that there’s lots of extortion in the red light district.  
Motorcycle gangs compete to control security at nightclubs; they battle each other for turf.  We 
send someone in to discover who’s who.  Our guy could be the bouncer.  He tells us who the 
leaders are, and we build a repressive investigation around them.”88 The statute thus made 
preventive, intelligence-gathering operations more important than ever, even as it sought to 
legitimate undercover operations in contradistinction to such investigations.    
 
The way in which the statute was implemented facilitated the expansion of preventive 
operations.  Specialized covert policing units were skilled in devising intricate false documents 
and elaborate cover stories for deep cover agents, who could be deployed preventively, to gather 
intelligence, as well as repressively, to collect evidence.   The creation of the new units also 
multiplied the personnel available to staff preventive exploratory investigations.  And the new 
covert policing units could supply preventive operations with informants, control officers, and 
logistical support. 
 
Collecting intelligence through preventive undercover operations is necessary not only to 
target and guide repressive operations but also to build the cover stories of deep cover agents.  
Undercover agents have to devote significant time to infiltrating the setting in which they must 
establish their cover.  Creating one’s cover story is akin to a preventive undercover operation 
(and escapes regulation under the statute which governs repressive operations.)  In the process of 
building his cover, the undercover agent investigates particular starting points for evidence-
gathering probes.  “For example, he may listen around and learn that there’s a grouping that 
imports drugs in shipments of bananas.  He learns their ports, their stopping places, the routes, 
the participants, and then he helps us figure out whether it’s worth entering this business.”89 
While accrediting himself, the deep cover agent becomes a well-placed source of intelligence.     
 
However, courts are unlikely to learn about undercover activity that preceded the 
prosecutor’s application for judicial approval to conduct repressive operations. As one judge 
reported (and others confirmed), “preventive undercover operations are never mentioned when 
the police seek approval for some evidence-gathering sting.  These preventive operations should 
really be in the application, to provide factual support for the request; but in fact, they never 
are.”90 Accordingly, cover-building operations may generate intelligence without judicial or 
even prosecutorial scrutiny. 
 
2.  Intelligence-Gathering After Judicial Approval of Repressive Undercover 
 Operations 
 
But the police also gather intelligence in their “repressive,” evidence-gathering capacity.  
There are two reasons for this.  First, obtaining statutory authorization for repressive operations 
sometimes allows the police to avoid constraints on gathering intelligence in the preventive 
 
87 A 1990 regulation envisaged just this sort of covert activity, by directing the police to undertake early-stage 
“proactive investigations” to collect the intelligence necessary to target specific milieus or individuals for repressive 
(evidence-gathering) stings. RiStBV Anl. E (1990). 
88 Interview with German chief of covert policing unit, May 26, 2003    
89 Innnt3erview with German prosecutor, May 22, 2003. 
90 Interview of German judge, May 27, 2003. 
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phase.  The federal authorities lack statutory authorization to conduct preventive undercover 
probes, and some states also disallow them.  When state law limits what the police can do 
preventively, the power to conduct repressive investigations shelters the search for intelligence, 
which the police could not otherwise have pursued through (preventive) undercover methods.  
According to a police official from one such jurisdiction, the police often conduct nominally 
repressive investigations in such ways that “we don’t make buys.   We simply gather information 
about foreign offender groups. …  Once we spent three years on a foreign offender group, 
working with several undercover agents.  We got to know them socially, made ourselves 
interesting to them by offering things they needed--partners in German businesses, contacts, 
transportation, access to airports.  And in this way we got lots of information, that was the aim.  
But somewhere down the road [this being a repressive investigation] there will have to be 
seizures and arrests.”91 
Authorities who could not collect intelligence preventively described other ways of doing 
so in the guise of gathering evidence.  One division reported using shallow cover agents to 
investigate drug dealing.  When the agents purchased drugs undercover, they usually testified (or 
were prepared to do so.)  But these evidence-gathering operations also allowed the police to 
“send guys in to build up a network of contacts, learn where the stuff gets sold, and in what 
quantities.  These guys move around in that community, visit bars, department stores, and people 
get to know them, and we start to know what the targets are up to.  What we learn from these 
operations never comes before a court…. It’s background for our investigative divisions.”92 
That shallow cover agents also purchased drugs undercover gave them a legitimate evidentiary 
reason for existing as an organizational unit.  But at least part of their function was to gather 
intelligence in a nominally repressive capacity (lacking statutory authorization for doing so 
preventively.)   
 
There is a second reason why the police may emphasize the collection of intelligence 
over the pursuit of evidence when conducting repressive undercover operations.  They need to 
protect the government’s investment in deep cover agents with elaborate false identities.  
Allowing the insights of undercover agents to be offered into evidence even indirectly, through 
the testimony of their control officers, jeopardizes the agents’ cover.  To avoid “burning” deep 
cover agents or their long-term cover stories, the police found ways to use them as sources of 
intelligence rather than evidence.   
 
Thus the police have powerful incentives to gather intelligence rather than evidence even 
when they investigate crimes in their repressive capacities.  They employ a number of covert 
tactics that permit them to do so.   One of these tactics, which one might term “strategic 
insulation,” is to separate the deep cover agent from the target whenever the police gather 
information that they expect to use as evidence in court.  The police avoid using deep cover 
officers in ways that will make them direct witnesses to the crimes the government hopes to 
prove.  “We use the undercover agent’s information in such a way that its source remains hidden; 
we won’t even use the hearsay testimony of his handler.”93 Thus the police often assign deep 
cover agents supporting roles in criminal investigations in order to keep  their activities out of 
 
91 Interview with supervisor in German covert policing unit, June 3, 2003. 
92 Interview with supervisor of shallow cover agents, May 12, 2004. .
93 Interview with supervisor of German covet policing unit, May 17, 2004. 
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court.  “The undercover agent is part of a larger mosaic, along with telephone tapping, visual 
surveillance of targets, financial investigations, etc.”94 The police also use what one might 
describe as a “bait and switch” tactic, in which the deep cover agent introduces the shallow cover 
agent and then disappears.  “We tend to use deep and shallow cover agents in tandem, so we can 
keep the deep cover agent out of the case.”95 
The use of shallow cover agents to insulate deep cover agent is only one among a series 
of  what I shall call “nesting mechanisms.”  These make it possible to build criminal cases out of 
undercover investigations while concealing the vast foundation of information acquired to 
support the bits of evidence used at trial.   For example, just as shallow cover agents can protect 
deep cover agents from detection, informants who are newcomers may come to shield more 
deeply embedded informants.  “Often our informant is very close to the target.  Then we 
introduce a informant from outside the milieu; he in turn introduces an undercover agent, who 
makes the undercover buy.”96 In other investigations, “the informant will buy small samples and 
then introduce the shallow cover agent for the main transaction.”97 Accordingly, a deeply 
embedded informant may hand off the target to a more distant informant, who may in turn pass 
the target along to the deep cover agent. The deep cover agent may introduce the target to a 
shallow cover agent.  This process screens three layers of intelligence from discovery—and 
possibly a fourth, if only the shallow cover agent’s handler openly testifies.   Conceivably, not 
even that may be necessary, if the agent’s information leads to searches, seizures and possession 
charges which obviate the need to prove the target’s past dealings with the agent.   In this way, 
much of what undercover investigations yield will remain in the realm of intelligence.   
 
The capacity of deep cover investigations to encourage collection of intelligence 
alongside evidence reinforces concerns about the overlap between preventive and repressive 
operations and, more significantly, about the functional resemblance of the work of undercover 
police and domestic intelligence agencies.  These dynamics put pressure on the legitimacy of 
undercover policing, given how readily covert operations undermine the principle of separation.  
This problem of legitimacy distinguishes Germany from the United States, which does not 
recognize the principle of separation.  The FBI has always conducted counter-intelligence 
investigations alongside its law enforcement operations.  Since the September 11 attacks, the FBI 
has emphasized intelligence gathering and has acquired greater powers to investigate domestic 
political organizations.   
 
3.  The Blurring of Roles Between “Hunters” and “Gatherers:” The Police and the APC 
 
The German legal system differentiated undercover policing from the covert 
responsibilities of Germany’s domestic intelligence agencies not only by directing the police to 
gather evidence, as distinct from intelligence.  In addition, Germany enforced institutional 
separation between the police and intelligence agencies by differentiating the subject matters 
which they were authorized to investigate.  State and federal Agencies for the Protection of the 
Constitution (APCs) pursued threats to national security.  Covert police work focused on crime, 
 
94 Interview with supervisor of German covert policing unit, June 2, 2004.   
95 Interview with German control officer, May 14, 2004. 
96 Interview with German prosecutor, May 19, 2004. 
97 Interview with German prosecutor, March 9, 2004. 
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particularly organized crime.  Like the functional division between the pursuit of intelligence and 
the collection of evidence, these subject matter distinctions have become blurred, reinforcing 
critics’ concerns that undercover policing threatens the principle of separation between police 
and intelligence agencies.  Starting in the 1990’s, the states and the federal government 
authorized their APCs to investigate organized crime in response to highly publicized claims that 
it had become a threat to national security.98 
Bringing the investigation of organized crime within the purview of the APCs proved 
highly controversial.  Many critics argued that this development violated the foundational 
principle separating the powers and prerogatives of intelligence agencies from those of the 
police.  Indeed, some APC officials themselves used this argument to propose that undercover 
investigations of organized crime be entrusted exclusively to them.99 
After the 9/11 attacks, the covert responsibilities of police and intelligence agencies 
converged even more.   The campaign against organized crime in the 1990s had led intelligence 
agencies to assert jurisdiction over offenses that had once been the exclusive domain of the 
police; after 9/11, the police became more deeply involved in investigating terrorist crimes and 
threats to national security—tasks once entrusted primarily to the APCs.  The police revamped 
their dormant “state security” divisions, which had once been repositories of espionage cases and 
hate crimes that the APC had investigated covertly and had then turned over to the police for the 
overt, public phase of investigation.  The new state security divisions could now initiate 
undercover investigations of their own to pursue terrorists and other threats to national security.   
 
Germany has drawn upon the police to investigate terrorism in part because the APC 
lacks formal coercive powers entitling them to arrest and interrogate suspects.100 For this, the 
state must call upon the police.  The impetus to expand covert police powers against terrorism 
also derives from the distrust between police and intelligence agencies.  “Since the police are 
responsible for crime prevention, and since the APCs have been pretty unforthcoming with 
intelligence, we must conduct our own covert terrorism investigations,” a police official 
explained.101 “Our work with the APC is highly problematic. The APCs put the protection of 
their sources above all else.  But the state protection division has to actually prove these crimes.  
So we and they really have to weigh very different considerations.”102 “They gather intelligence 
and figure out later what they want to do with it.  We investigate crimes.  Our investigations are 
much more directed towards specific, law-enforcement goals.  We are the hunters; they are the 
gatherers. They have a much more passive role.  They allow things to happen and watch; we 
have to be active, to get things to happen, so we can prove them afterwards.”103 
98 See e.g. Art. 3 I 1 Nr. 4 BayVSG. 
99 Albert, ZRP 1995, 103 (in which the director of the Saarland APC suggests assigning all deep cover operations of 
organized crime to the state and federal APCs, out of respect for the principle of separation and because deep cover 
operatives should have the power to commit crimes, which the police currently lack.)   
100 Marco Koenig, Trennung und Zusammenarbeit von Polizei und Nachrichtendiensten, (2005). 
101 Interview with German control officer, May 12, 2004. 
102 Interview with chief of German covert policing unit, March 10, 2004. 
103 Interview with chief of German covert policing unit, March 8, 2004. 
28
Thus convergence on shared subject matters requires the police and the APCs to 
cooperate even as it brings out differences between the rules that govern their practices and the 
gulf between their institutional cultures.  The police, unlike the intelligence services, are bound 
by the principle of legality.  This principle limits the extent to which undercover agents may lie 
low while infiltrating criminal settings.  At some point during or after the investigation, they 
must intervene to arrest and prosecute those who have committed crimes.  Releasing the 
intelligence services  from this obligation makes sense because they lack arrest powers and 
because it may be useful to allow some class of operatives to observe subversive conspiracies 
without risking their cover.  But without the principle of legality to constrain them, the APCs can 
tolerate crimes not only by their targets but by their own personnel, without having to intervene.  
And because they do not have to worry about building a case against their targets, they do not 
have to worry about entrapment.   
 
Once infiltration became an accepted police tactic and the APCs and the police began to 
share jurisdiction over organized crime and terrorism, these differences in the prerogatives and 
institutional cultures of the police and the APCs posed huge obstacles to the ever more urgent 
task of cooperation.  The APCs had to fear that the police would compromise their operatives by 
intervening too soon or would inadvertently target them, not knowing who they were.  The 
police had to fear that APC agents and informants would work at cross-purposes with the police.  
They also worried that APC informants would influence the crimes the police were investigating, 
thereby jeopardizing criminal prosecution by supporting claims of entrapment.   But the shared 
jurisdiction of the APC and the police meant that they had to work together while playing by 
different rules.   Thus, even as undercover policing seeks legitimacy by differentiating itself from 
the work of the APCs, police and APCs have increasingly come to converge on similar tasks.  
These resulting overlap in responsibilities required a degree of inter-agency cooperation that 
sharpened the conflict between their respective governing norms, to some extent challenging the 
viability of the rules and values that set police infiltration apart.   
 
Though the United States does not prohibit law enforcement agencies from gathering 
intelligence, it does distinguish between law enforcement investigations targeting suspected 
criminals and intelligence operations, which seek out threats to national security.  In the United 
States, however, this distinction has very different implications for the legitimacy of covet 
tactics. 
 
4.   The Contested Legitimacy of Domestic Intelligence Investigations in the United 
States 
 
Americans and Germans alike worry about undercover policing but direct their strongest 
anxieties at different features of covert operations.  Americans have not been particularly 
concerned about the generation of intelligence through criminal investigations, or about the 
demarcation of those investigations from domestic intelligence operations.  (The FBI functions 
as both a law enforcement and intelligence agency.)  Instead, Americans have primarily worried 
about the use of covert powers o manipulate, disrupt, or radicalize political organizations; to 
retaliate against political dissidents; or to interfere with religious observance through the 
infiltration of churches and mosques.   In addition, we are concerned that intelligence operations 
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have a tendency to expand too far beyond their original scope.  (We are less worried about 
criminal investigations broadening their mandate.)   
 
Why is the United States so concerned about undercover policing interfering with civil 
and political liberties and the exercise of First Amendment rights?  A series of high-profile 
Congressional hearings in the 1970s and 1980s highlighted persistent abuses of domestic 
intelligence investigations against “wholly lawful forms of political expression.” From 1973 to 
1976, a Senate committee (known as the Church Commission) explored covert operations 
through which the FBI attempted to discredit the antiwar, civil rights, and Women’s Liberation 
of the 1960s and early 1970s.104 Among other tactics, the FBI “falsely and anonymously 
label[ed] as Government informants members of groups known to be violent, thereby exposing 
the falsely labeled member to expulsion or physical attack” and “provoked target groups into 
rivalries that might result in deaths.”  The FBI illegally wiretapped Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
on the grounds that he could prove dangerous if he abandoned his adherence to nonviolence, and 
then “threaten[ed] to release tape recordings [from the illegal wiretaps] unless Dr. King 
committed suicide.”  In its Final Report of 1976, the Commission condemned as the 
government’s covert tactics as “unworthy of a democracy” and “occasionally reminiscent of the 
tactics of totalitarian regimes.”     
 
Controversy about domestic intelligence investigations also centered on their tendency to 
generate too much information and to expand beyond the original objectives that induced and 
legitimated such operations.  The United States and Germany are both concerned about this 
tendency—but the U.S. primarily worries about intelligence operations; Germany about criminal 
investigations.  The Church Commission complained about “a consistent pattern in which 
programs initiated with limited goals, such as preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign 
spies, were expanded to [function as] ‘vacuum cleaners,’ sweeping in information about lawful 
activities of American citizens.”  As an example, the Commission cited the FBI’s twenty-five 
year investigation of the NAACP to investigate the possible influence of Communists, which 
continued even though “nothing was found to rebut a report during the first year of the 
investigation that the NAACP had a ‘strong tendency’ to steer clear of Communist activities.”  
Indeed, such concerns resurfaced resurfaced in the early 1980s, after it became public that the 
FBI had conducted what an independent inquiry described as an overbroad investigation of the 
Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, or “CISPES,” based on information that 
did not meet the evidentiary threshold mandated by the agency’s own guidelines.  In 1988, the 
Senate Select committee on Intelligence concluded that the FBI’s investigation of CISPES had 
“resulted in the investigation of domestic political activities protected by the First Amendment 
that should not have come under governmental scrutiny.”105 
As a result of the Church Committee findings of 1976, Congress considered enacting 
charter legislation that would set the ground rules for domestic intelligence operations and 
protect First Amendment rights of free speech and free association.  Attorney General Edward 
 
104 During the late 1960s and early 197os, the FBI conducted a counterintelligence program known as 
“COINTELPRO” which sought to “disrupt” groups and “neutralize” individuals who, the FBI believed, posed 
threats to domestic security.  Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities (United States Senate). 
105 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 101st Cong., The FBI and CISPES at 3, 103. 
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Levi forestalled the passage of the statute by enacting new, restrictive guidelines for “domestic 
security investigations.”106 He testified before Congress that his reforms “proceed from the 
proposition that government monitoring of individuals and groups because they hold unpopular 
or controversial political views is intolerable in our society.”107 These reforms restricted the 
scope of domestic intelligence investigations.  At the same time, he addressed concerns about 
covert tactics by enacting separate guidelines for the FBI use of informants.108 
What is striking about the controversy surrounding domestic security investigations is 
that our concern with civil and political liberties and First Amendment rights plays very much 
the role in the United States that Germany’s dignitary conception of privacy has come to play in 
Germany’s legal and political discourse.   The Church Commission’s scathing criticism of 
government tactics designed to “’enhance paranoia’” of political dissidents and to “’get the point 
across [that] there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox” are reminiscent of German concerns 
with safeguarding a zone of privacy within which targets of criminal investigations can be free 
from government surveillance.  Both Germany and the United States fear the inhibiting effects 
that invasive and overbroad tactics may have on society in general and the freedom of 
individuals—though, in the United States, the liberties which critics like the Church Commission 
have worried about were more explicitly political in nature.   In both Germany and the United 
States, these comparable concerns produced demands for codification—though the Levi reforms 
headed off the enactment of statutory controls in the U.S. 
 
Precisely because American fears about overt operations center largely on domestic 
intelligence investigations rather than criminal probes, the Levi Guidelines turned to undercover 
criminal investigations as the model of legitimate covert activity and as the source of standards 
for domestic intelligence operations.   Under the Levi Guidelines, the FBI were to restrict 
domestic intelligence operations to the investigation of individuals or groups who not only 
violate civil rights or seek to interfere with or overthrow the government, but who do so through 
activities that “involve or will involve the violation of federal law” as well as “the use of force or 
violence.”  Thus the standard for proper covert operations in the intelligence arena became the 
criminal standard—requiring some indication that criminal offenses were in the offing.  
Subsequent administrations gradually relaxed the demand for evidence of impending criminal 
wrongdoing before a domestic security investigation could be initiated. his trend accelerated after 
the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, when the FBI stopped interpreting the Guidelines as 
requiring evidence of an imminent violation of federal law and instead interpreted it to permit the 
investigation of domestic group that advocate violence and possess the ability to carry out violent 
acts.109 After the September 11 attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft further expanded the use 
of undercover techniques in terrorism investigations by authorizing FBI agents to “attend public 
 
106 Federal Bureau of Investigation Compliance with the Attorney General’s Investigative Guidelines, Special 
Report, September 2005 at III.A. . 
107 FBI Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 257 (1976).  
108 These guidelines were intended “not only to minimize [use of informants] but also to ensure that individual rights 
[were] not infringed and that the government itself did not become a violator of the law.” 1982 Final Report of the 
Senate Select Committee to Study Undercover Activities, at 531 (Levi Informant Guidelines, Introduction).    
109 Advice to Field Offices Regarding Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations and Preliminary Investigations 
Under theAttorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering and Domestic Security/Terrorism 
Investigations, November 1, 1995.    
31
events … for the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities, without the predication 
required to investigate leads or conduct a preliminary inquiry or full investigation.”110 
Undercover agents may now visit churches or mosques without any allegation that that 
congregants are involved in unlawful activity.  But the current administration has not repealed 
those parts of the Levi Guidelines which provide that domestic security investigations cannot be 
based solely on an individual’s exercise of First Amendment rights.111 The debate triggered by 
the relaxation of the criminal standard still proceeds from the assumption that undercover 
operations are most legitimate when they pursue evidence of a criminal offense—and least 
legitimate when they target lawful political and religious activity. 
 
The United States assumes that covert tactics enjoy greater legitimacy in criminal 
investigations than in domestic intelligence operations –which is a reason why we use the former 
as a model for the latter. By contrast, German fears coalesce around the use of covert tactics in 
criminal investigations.  By why?  It is certainly not the case that APC intelligence investigations 
enjoy uncontested legitimacy.  There has been recurrent controversy about the participation of 
APC informants in crimes and about their infiltration of extremist organizations such as the 
NDP.   But the use of covert intelligence is to some extent a legal given, in part because the 
APCs are exempt from the principle of legality.  More importantly, however, their undercover 
assignment is an artifact of the Cold War and the division of Germany after World War Two, as 
the Allies sought to suppress Communism as well as the resurgence of Nazi and neo-Nazi 
sentiment.   The postwar constitutional architecture of the Federal Republic required the APCs to 
infiltrate threatening political movements and monitor even lawful political expression in ways 
that have no exact counterpart in the United States.  Moreover, APC investigations cannot be 
tethered to the criminal standard because the principle of separation mandates their segregation 
from the police and deprives them of coercive prerogatives, including arrest powers.  The APCs 
are supposed to investigate precisely those incipient threats to domestic security that have not 
ripened into offenses, or even into preparation for criminal activity.  And conversely, police 
infiltration is supposed to yield evidence for criminal prosecution, not intelligence.   The 
tendency of covert investigations to generate intelligence makes undercover policing appear as 
an unwarranted usurpation of the powers and tactics entrusted to the APCs.  In the face of these 
constraints on the police, coupled with the APCs’ built-in constitutional mandate, German critics 
who fear the spread of a “culture of surveillance” have little hope of challenging the covert 
operations of intelligence agencies head-on, except when these go too far.  Accordingly, 
academics and legal reformers have instead attempted to quarantine the covert powers within the 
APCs and to challenge the adoption of covert tactics by the police.   
 
These problems of legitimacy arise to some extent from the particularities of the German 
system analyzed in Section V.  Some of these difficulties are closely related to features of the 
covert system that are specific to Germany—such as the separation of the prerogatives of 
intelligence agencies from those of the police and the distinction between federally regulated 
repressive powers and state-governed preventive policing.  But the attempt to legitimate 
undercover policing also has to confront problems that are intrinsic to undercover work.  These 
include the necessity of permitting undercover agents to take part in the crimes they investigate 
 
110 OIG Report at 19.   
111 General Crimes Guidelines, Section I (General Principles.)  The possibility of infiltrating public gatherings 
without the opening of an official investigation has weakened this principle. 
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(even if only in circumscribed capacities); the danger of entrapment; and the ability of 
undercover operations to influence the criteria by which their performance is judged.  These 
dilemmas challenge the policing systems of Germany, Western Europe, and the United States all 
must address, though the national context influences their configuration and the degree to which 
they matter to legal actors or the public.  How these intrinsic difficulties of undercover policing 
challenge its legitimacy, and how the German system has responded, is the theme of Section VI.   
 
VI. Mediating the Inherent Dilemmas of Undercover Policing: The Problems of 
Lawbreaking, Entrapment, and Retrofitting Criteria of Success 
 
Germany’s 1992 Organized Crime Act tacitly legitimated undercover policing by 
requiring prosecutorial or judicial oversight in advance of covert operations and by limiting those 
operations to the most serious crimes and then only as a last resort.  German jurists reassure 
themselves about the propriety of undercover policing by likening it to electronic surveillance, 
which is similarly regulated by a system of advance approvals and limitation to specific 
crimes.112 Yet the analogy is far from complete.  Covert operatives have a special ability to 
influence the criminal milieu they investigate and to be shaped, in turn, by the targets they 
associate with.  Such reciprocal influences are, of course, not unique to undercover operations.113 
But the influences of covert operatives may be particularly subtle and hard to detect or to trace to 
the government.  As a special case of this interaction effect, undercover policing poses a number 
of dangers.  First, agents may encourage their targets’ propensity towards wrongdoing.  Second, 
agents may themselves become tainted if they participate too actively in the crimes they 
investigate, or if they permit crimes to occur and allow third parties to be harmed.  Third, the 
covert policing system tends to generate the criteria by which it is judged to match what agents 
find in the field.  I shall call these risks the “interaction dangers” of undercover policing. The 
legitimacy of undercover operations depends on the ability of the regulatory system to contain 
these interaction dangers.  It also depends on the degree to which undercover policing promotes 
the ends, such as reduction of organized crime, which justify covert powers.   
 
The 1992 statute did not expressly address itself to the interaction dangers of undercover 
policing.  Both before and after the act, the substantive limits on covert tactics came from 
elsewhere. Before the 1992 Act, the German system relied heavily on two substantive norms.  
First, undercover agents could not commit crimes.  The principle of legality required them to 
take action against those who did (including both targets and government operatives.)114 Second, 
the doctrine of entrapment prohibited agents from excessively encouraging targets to commit 
crimes. 115 These are the substantive norms of undercover operations.  They guard against the 
first two of the three interaction dangers.  The third danger—that covert operatives could 
manipulate the criteria of success—has not received the same attention.   
 
112 St PO 100c. 
113 Gary T. Marx, Ironies of Social Control: Authorities as Contributors to Deviance Through Escalation, 
Nonenforcement and Covert Facilitation, in R. Merton (ed.) Unanticipated Consequences of Social Action: 
Variations on a Sociological Theme. (1978).  
114 St PO 152; 163.  
115 See note 33 above. 
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The regime that grew up after the 1992 Act did not supersede the substantive norms 
restraining undercover policing.116 Nor did the statute entrust the enforcement of the substantive 
norms to the judges who pre-authorize deep cover operations. When judges approve 
investigations, they do not decide what the police can and cannot do.  The police design the 
tactics of covert operations, though prosecutors provide them with guidance.  The statute did 
establish the prima facie legal validity of undercover investigations that received advance 
judicial approval, so long as the formal requirements (such as listing a qualifying predicate 
offense, and meeting a minimal evidentiary standard for suspicion) had been satisfied.117 By 
premising the legal validity of covert operations on compliance with procedural requirements, 
the statute shifted the focus of reviewing courts away from whether undercover tactics complied 
with substantive norms—a key determinant of lawfulness before the procedural controls came 
along—and towards the more easily answered question of whether the proper procedural steps 
had been followed in obtaining approval in advance.  In demonstrating that they had properly 
obtained advance authorization, the police did not have to demonstrate compliance with the 
substantive norms.  Courts could assume compliance unless contrary evidence emerged.    
 
The statute did not provide any new guidance on how police should answer the difficult 
questions raised by the substantive norms: where does the law draw the line between 
(impermissibly) committing a crime and (permissibly) pretending to commit one?  What 
pressures or enticements may agents employ? At what point should the legal system decide 
these questions—before, during, or after a covert investigation?  And who should make these 
decisions?   
 
Section VI explores the ways in which the covert policing system grapples with the 
dilemmas of regulating these interaction effects.  The Section does not provide the German 
“answer” to these problems, still less its “resolution” of them.  There can be no fully satisfying 
resolution, insofar as these dilemmas are inherent in covert practices.  Undercover operations 
cannot work unless the police, in the name of public safety and crime control, occasionally 
commit crimes and encourage targets to do so.  The German system—like the regulatory regimes 
of other Western European countries and the United States—mediates these dilemmas and limits 
their manifestations.  Section VI has two aims: first, to explore on their own terms German 
approaches to the interaction effects of undercover policing; and second, in so doing, to bring out 
a set of problems and a repertoire of justifications, distinctions, evasions, and compromises that 
can be used in pursuing comparisons with the regulatory regimes of other countries. 
 
A. Infiltrators May Not Commit Crimes: But What Does it Mean to Commit a Crime? 
 
1.   Changing Institutional Contexts of Criminal Liability: From Individual to Shared 
Responsibility 
 
116 Legislators rejected a proposal to permit undercover agents to commit crimes that were necessary to win the 
confidence of targets. BDrS 74/90. Stenographische Protokolle des Rechtsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages 
Nr 31 und 36, 1992; Hilger NStZ 1992, 525. See also Albert, ZRP 1995, 103.    
117 The factual basis had to establish “Anfangsverdacht”—“initial suspicion”-- a minimal evidentiary threshold akin 
to “reasonable suspicion.” “Initial suspicion lies well below the standard of “dringender Tatverdacht” which is 
Germany’s counterpart to “probable cause” and is needed to justify arrest.   
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Any undercover policing system must worry about law-breaking by covert agents.  It 
must distinguish between permissible and impermissible criminal conduct.  But unlike the 
United states, Germany officially prohibits all law-breaking outright.  It backs this up with a 
principle of compulsory prosecution.  Since Germany forbids covert agents from committing 
crimes, police and prosecutors must constantly confront the question: what does it mean to 
commit a crime?   
 
The question does not pose itself with the same urgency in the United States, which 
pragmatically accepts that undercover agents may sometimes violate the letter of the law in order 
to catch criminals.118 The United States protects agents from criminal liability when they have 
obtained the necessary approvals from their supervisors.119 The blanket immunity for 
authorized acts of law-breaking is further backed up by prosecutorial discretion in deciding 
whether to bring charges.  Indeed, the FBI’s internal guidelines expressly permit undercover 
agents to engage in “otherwise criminal conduct.” To be sure, recent amendments to the 
Guidelines have “clarif[ied] that felony activity by an FBI undercover employee [like the risk of 
civil lawsuits] is a sensitive circumstance requiring approval” from a centralized committee.120 
Nor may an undercover agent obstruct justice or commit an act of violence (except in self-
defense.)121 But in the United States, criminal penalties are generally reserved for rogue agents 
who commit crimes on their own account. 
 
By contrast, German police and prosecutors may not authorize violations of the criminal 
laws.  Accordingly, they confront the delicate task of distinguishing conduct that seems criminal.  
How do they do this? The pre-1992 system treated violations of substantive norms by police 
officers as individual failures.  The officer needed to conform his behavior to the norms and, if 
he did not, the responsibility was his.  The post-1992 regime emphasizes institutional as well as 
individual responsibility for compliance with substantive norms.  Prosecutors supervise 
undercover police and advise them on the implications of the substantive norms in covert 
operations.  They are keenly aware that their role in shaping undercover investigations exposes 
prosecutors themselves to the risk of incurring criminal liability.  The police have created 
specialized covert units containing deep cover and shallow cover agents, control officers, 
informant handlers, surveillance teams, and logistical personnel who obtain the apartments, 
vehicles, and documents needed to support elaborate cover stories. Together they work out the 
ground level meaning of the substantive norms.  This means they also share responsibility for 
deviations from substantive norms. Within covert policing units, there is no sharp division 
between undercover agents and the colleagues who supported their efforts. “All of us in the 
office are really living undercover; our office is a front, made to look like some regular 
business.”122 “The undercover agent isn’t a lone wolf; the whole pack of us, the whole team, all 
of us are on the line with him.”123 
118 See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998); Wayne R. LaFave, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, Section 
10.7 (2d ed. 1986)    
119 United States v. Achter, 52 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 891 (9th Cir. 
1994); 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, Section 142(a), p. 121 (1984).   
120 This is the Criminal Undercover Operations Review Committee.  See OIG Report at 149.  
121 Guidelines Section III C.1.b. 
122 Interview of German control officer, May 19, 2004. 
123 Id. 
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The shared responsibility of police and prosecutors in conducting undercover operations 
should conform covert tactics to the demands of the substantive norms.  And to some extent it 
appears to do so. Prosecutors and police officials alike emphasized that it was their responsibility 
to design undercover tactics in ways that avoided involving agents too directly in the crimes they 
investigate. They also tried to reduce the risk of undercover agents having to accredit themselves 
through what I have elsewhere termed “ancillary” crimes.124 These are offenses distinct from 
those which the police are investigating but which protect the infiltrator’s cover and make him 
believable in his role.  Avoiding criminal liability was not simply a matter of making sure the 
agent “stuck to his script.”  It depended crucially on how that script was written.   “We use the 
deep cover agent in several investigations at once.  We have him play multiple roles.  Otherwise, 
if we send him exclusively to one place, he will eventually have to take part in whatever 
everyone else is doing there; he would eventually have to commit crimes.”125 “The agent 
always has to be at the periphery of the targeted group; otherwise, if he’s right smack in the 
middle, they hold the reins and he has to do what they ask, and then we’d have to pull him out 
early.”126 
Prosecutors and police are less concerned that agents might have to commit ancillary 
crimes to accredit themselves than that agents might need to take part in the very crimes they are 
supposed to investigate. Police officials and prosecutors prohibit covert operatives from taking 
too active a part in crimes that produce excessive social harm, even if an agent believes that his 
participation will yield evidence against a target.  Supervisors do not allow undercover 
operatives to drive convoys of illegal immigrants—a practice that is too risky and that makes the 
agent not a peripheral figure but the very instrument of alien smuggling.127 Undercover agents 
cannot work as pimps or in other capacities that require them to use violence128 (though, as 
discussed below, there are conditions under which some violence might be tolerated.).   Nor, in 
theory, can they take part in robberies or burglaries (though they can help with preparations), or 
release drugs or guns into the market.129 
But the close involvement of prosecutors in covert police operations does not always 
ensure compliance with the substantive norms.  Prosecutors’ expertise in legal interpretation—in 
casuistry—can justify covert investigations that strain against the spirit of the substantive norms 
without violating the letter of the norms.  Prosecutors and police officials who specialize in 
covert operations increasingly see themselves as responsible for providing a legal framework that 
allows undercover agents to obtain evidence. In part, this means permitting borderline practices 
while imposing constraints that would conform them, more or less, to legal requirements.  And in 
part this means reinterpreting the law to lift legal constraints (or finding that they did not apply in 
the first place).  When neither of these strategies is promising, prosecutors and police officials 
sometimes quietly subordinate the substantive norms to other institutional goals, such as 
preventing crime and protecting undercover operatives.  Since undercover investigations often 
produce not evidence but intelligence (which does not get into court), judges have little 
 
124 Jacqueline E. Ross, Impediments to Transnational Cooperation in Undercover Policing: A Comparative Study of 
the United States and Italy, 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 569-624  (2004). 
125 Chief of covert policing unit, March 10, 2004. 
126 Interview with supervisor in German covert policing unit, May 19, 2003. 
127 Interview with German control officer, May 26, 2003. 
128 Interview with supervisor in German covert policing unit, May 27, 2003. 
129 Interview with German prosecutors, May 21 and may 22, 2003. 
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opportunity to curtail the “creative” interpretations of prosecutors.  As one judge put it, 
“undercover agents don’t testify; if they or the informants break the law, we have no way of 
knowing it.”130 
2. The Conflicting Role Obligations of Undercover Agents   
 
The post 1992 undercover policing system has provided German police supervisors and 
prosecutors with more effective mechanisms for making ground level covert operations conform 
to the demands of the substantive norms.  But in this work, how do they interpret the substantive 
norms?  In practice, how do they mediate between, on one hand, the pragmatic objectives of 
obtaining evidence and catching criminals and, on the other hand, the substantive norms?  How 
do they import pragmatic justifications of undercover policing into their interpretation of the 
substantive norms?  And under what circumstances does this process of importation and 
justification break down?  When it does break down, are unlawful practices tolerated anyway—
or banned and rejected outright? 
 
Conversations with prosecutors and police officials revealed that the reciprocal 
adaptations of practice and doctrine take many different forms.  An agent may buy stolen goods 
or contraband because he does not intend to use or distribute the drugs.131 This is obvious.  But it 
is a harder question whether an agent could return samples or kick back part of the contraband to 
a middleman.  Some prosecutors opined that agents could not do this, even if refusing to return a 
sample meant having to forego a larger purchase from the same source.132 Other police officials 
and prosecutors believed that returning a portion of the sample might be justified on grounds of 
necessity in unforeseen emergencies.133 And still others explained that the decision depended on 
a weighing of law enforcement interests. “An undercover agent got hold of a high-denomination 
counterfeit note and the organization wanted it back.  This was really a gray zone, because it’s 
illegal to put counterfeit notes into circulation.  But you can still return contraband, depending on 
how much you’re giving back, what it will accomplish, and whether there’s some proportionality 
here” (that is, whether the offense the agent commits is less serious than the crime he hopes to 
prove).134 
Minimizing the causal role of agents in criminal activities is a critical objective of the 
German undercover policing system, and one to which it has given much thought.  But the 
meaning of “minimization” is itself flexible and context-specific. Playing a subordinate role 
becomes particularly important if the agent knows in advance that he must allow the crime to 
succeed.  Thus, agent cannot work as a mechanic for a car theft ring if he has to fix up stolen 
vehicles and then let the criminals remove them.135 If an agent does play a central role in an 
unfolding crime, he cannot let it succeed.  If, for example, he alters license plates on a stolen 
vehicle, then he has to make sure the police seize it later.136 And if he himself helps steal a car, 
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he has to ensure that the police recover more than just the stolen vehicle—for instance, that they 
seize the whole workshop where vehicles are retooled.137 
Usually prosecutors and police adapt practice to respect limitations imposed by the 
substantive norms while interpreting the norms to accommodate useful practices.  But in some 
instances, the dialectical relationship between practice and norms breaks down.  In that case, 
prosecutors and police sometimes suspend the substantive norms in limited instances in the 
pursuit of other goals (such as crime-control or protection of agents).138 They deploy this power 
to excuse a variety of crimes by agents, some trivial and some not.  “With the permission of the 
prosecutor, we can let our infiltrators transport stolen goods,” one official explained.  “It’s a 
matter of weighing the seriousness of the crimes they commit against the seriousness of the 
crimes they’re investigating.”139 On the other hand, a police official opined that a “deep cover 
agent can take part in ordinary, commercial burglaries, if risks to third parties can be 
managed.”140 “Throwing a Molotov cocktail into a shed is no big deal, if it only damages 
property,”  a prosecutor stated.141 And when prosecutors could not approve certain crimes in 
advance, they could often avoid charging an agent who “slides into crime inadvertently” by 
resorting to the power to shelve cases for “minimal blameworthiness.”142 It was informally taken 
for granted that participating in criminal activity was to some extent unavoidable despite the 
formal prohibition.  “If an undercover agent does find himself in a position where he has to 
commit a crime to avoid losing his cover, it’s our job to . . . protect him from liability.”143 Once 
you suspend the substantive norms in the name of larger law enforcement interests, where do you 
stop? 
 
Even prosecutors and police who sometimes find ways to avoid the substantive norms 
insist on their necessity.  Participants in the German undercover policing system do not wish to 
formally exempt agents from criminal liability.  “The debate, years ago,” recalled one 
prosecutor, “was whether to give undercover agents more maneuver room through a more 
powerful necessity doctrine which would allow them to commit crimes when the interest in 
clearing up one crime clearly outweighed the interest in not committing a lesser crime.”144 Such 
an exemption would have eroded prosecutors’ supervisory role and therefore the value of their 
expertise in distinguishing permissible from impermissible practices and excusable from serious 
misconduct.  Prosecutors worried that agents enjoying an exemption from criminal liability 
would commit different and worse abuses than those that prosecutors were willing to tolerate. 
“The necessity defense is enough protection from liability,” a prosecutor stated. “And you don’t 
want to immunize the agent for other, genuine crimes.  If he commits a crime, it may be alright if 
there are other, greater crimes he’s preventing.  But that’s a completely post hoc justification.  
You can never permit that in advance.”145 And according to another prosecutor, who was willing 
even to countenance a limited use of violence under some circumstances, “It’s one thing for an 
 
137 Interview with German prosecutor, May 13, 2004. 
138 Police officials reported that they typically checked with prosecutors first. 
139 Interview with German prosecutor, May 10, 2004. 
140 Interview with supervisor of German covert policing unit, May 10, 2004. 
141 Interview with German prosecutor, March 9, 2004. 
142 Interview with supervisor of German covert policing unit, March 8, 2004 
143 Interview with German prosecutor, March 10, 2004. 
144 Interview with German prosecutor, March 10, 2004. 
145 Interview with German prosecutor, May 22, 2003. 
38
agent to have to beat up a prostitute because otherwise he’d be in danger himself.  It’s another 
thing to hire him out as a henchman whose job it is to discipline prostitutes.”146 
Prosecutors and police accept the desirability of the substantive norms not only because 
they restrain abuses, but because they allow sufficient maneuver room for covert operations to 
proceed effectively.  The mutual accommodation of undercover practices and the substantive 
norms, as detailed above, provides one form of maneuver room.  Additional maneuver room 
comes from a tacit assumption in the 1992 statute legitimating undercover policing: namely, that 
there is nothing inherently criminal about an agent offering a target the opportunity to commit a 
crime by posing as an accomplice.  Acting like an accomplice and facilitating a crime cannot be 
inherently criminal (a violation of the substantive norms) if undercover policing is legal.  This 
premise of the statute carved out a safe zone within which the prohibitions of the substantive 
norms lost much of their relevance for undercover policing.  If covert policing was inherently 
about facilitating crimes, then doing so could not be illegal.   
 
In accordance with the logic of the statute, most evidence-gathering stings cast 
undercover agents in supporting roles in which they facilitated their targets’ illegal ventures.  
Agents provide useful services such as transport, storage, and financing, or referrals to tax 
advisers, lawyers, and landlords.147 If passing along child pornography remained risky for police, 
posing as the administrator of a computer system and offering one’s technical know-how was 
much less so.148 Undercover police could run security agencies providing body guards,  book 
travel, rent out warehouses, offer law enforcement “contacts” in the Customs Service, pose as 
interpreters or local guides, broker real estate, set up bank accounts, or provide trucks and ships 
with secret containers.149 The possibilities were almost endless.  To avoid charges of entrapment, 
it was best if the targets already had customers waiting for their business.  
 
Strictly speaking, the logic of the statute itself does not provide maneuver room for 
agents.  But it dovetails with, and legitimates, a pre-existing reading of criminal law doctrine that 
shielded agents from liability.  Under substantive criminal law, an accomplice derives her 
liability, in large part, from her unlawful purpose of willing the principal’s success.150 The 
undercover agents’ law enforcement purpose serves as their shield from criminal liability since 
they intend the principal (the target) to fail.151 To be sure, doubts may remain about whether the 
agent did not, after all, intend the crime to succeed.  An undercover agent who plans to seize an 
imported drug shipment can be said to intend her targets success, if this means simply that she 
wants her targets to import cocaine.  But here, too, German criminal law has obliged with a 
distinction between willing the accomplishment of a crime and willing its success.  
Commentators reason that undercover agents wish their targets to accomplish their offense 
without willing their targets to succeed in distributing the drugs to other dealers or users.152 
146 Interview with supervisor of German covert policing unit, June 2, 2003. 
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B. Entrapment: Bringing to Light Pressures Exerted in the Dark 
 
Concerns about entrapment are closely related to worries about government law-
breaking.  They are two sides of the same coin.  By facilitating a crime, an agent makes herself 
an (excused) “criminal” and encourages the target to become a real criminal.  When an agent 
assists a target’s criminal plans, the German doctrine of entrapment usually reduces the penalty 
that the target receives for the offense, even if the target was predisposed to commit the crime 
and eagerly participated.  In Germany, entrapment (known as “Tatprovokation,” or “deed 
provocation”) serves as a mitigating factor at sentencing.153 It is based on a different logic than 
its American counterpart.  Subjective variants of the American entrapment defense ask whether 
the infiltrator’s actions “implanted the criminal design” in the mind of a person not otherwise 
predisposed to commit such a crime.154 Objective variants ask whether the infiltrator’s conduct 
would have implanted such idea in a hypothetical law-abiding person (even if the actual 
defendant was herself predisposed.)155 Most American jurisdictions apply a subjective or hydrid 
test, evaluating the infiltrator’s conduct from an objective standpoint but refusing to afford a 
defense to a defendant who was subjectively predisposed to commit the offense, even if the 
governments actions would have sufficed to corrupt an otherwise law-abiding target.156 And the 
American entrapment doctrine is a bi-modal, all or nothing affair: it is either a complete defense 
(which leads to acquittal) or none at all.157 
The German counterpart to our entrapment doctrine is a not a defense but a sentencing 
factor.  It is a more scalar concept since it correlates sentencing reductions to degrees of 
government influence.  Such influences can be negligible—for instance, when the infiltrator 
observes events and becomes a human alternative to a tape recorder or bugging device.  It can be 
greater when the covert operative facilitates crimes by providing logistical support or purchasing 
illegal wares.  Government influence becomes paramount when an agent supplies essential 
ingredients or know-how; when she forges connections between otherwise unaffiliated offender 
groups; or when she supplies opportunities that offenders might not have encountered on their 
own.  Even minimal forms of encouragement, pressure, or aid entitle targets to some sentencing 
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discount.158 Why is this?  First, the government’s involvement reduced the risk of the crime 
inflicting actual harms.  The participation of agents often implies that the government had the 
target under surveillance so that bystanders at the crime scene could be protected and weapons 
and contraband seized.  Second, the German system gives sentencing discounts to targets who 
are less culpable and less dangerous to society because they required prompting, and perhaps 
assistance, to commit an offense.159 
Entrapment doctrine encourages undercover agents to minimize their facilitation of 
targets’ crimes.  Unduly active participation could trigger sentencing breaks for defendants so 
sizeable as to undercut the value of a covert operation.  Entrapment functions as a deterrent to the 
sorts of steering and influence that makes it difficult to distinguish mopes from mobsters.  The 
scalar nature of German entrapment, which calibrates sentencing discounts to variations in the 
degree of infiltrators’ influence on targets, affects the design of undercover operations.  
Undercover agents could purchase contraband but not “place an order.”160 “You have to act just 
like you would if you were a normal buyer,” an agent stated, “so you have to be careful not to 
offer too much money.”161 “We have to be very careful, because someone who’s already 
predisposed can still be entrapped.”162 “If the guy is selling small amounts of hash, I can’t put 
him up to selling me larger quantities.”163 
In distinguishing degrees of influence, the German entrapment doctrine makes it possible 
for sentencing courts to factor government law-breaking into its penalties for targets.  Agents 
who participate in the crimes they investigate not only break the law; they also influence the 
course of events.  The more actively infiltrators take part in the crime, the less defendants need to 
do to make them happen.  This raises questions about the extent to which undercover law-
breaking shapes or distorts the crimes in which agents participate.  Factoring these contributions 
into the penalties for targets to some extent compensates for the willingness of police and 
prosecutors to license some conduct by infiltrators that would subject others to criminal liability.   
 
There are reasons to speculate that Germany’s scalar system restrains police influence on 
targets more than its American counterpart.  The American entrapment defense is an all-or-
nothing affair: a judge or jury accepts the defendant’s claim of entrapment and acquits him, or 
rejects the claim.  Police inducements and pressures just short of full-fledged entrapment will not 
expose the government to adverse consequences, while maximizing the likelihood of proving the 
crime.  By contrast, German entrapment creates a scalar system.  The more the police manipulate 
the target, the greater the sentence reduction.  German police have an incentive to minimize 
inducements and pressures.  American police do not, so long as they respect the boundary that 
separates permissible influence from entrapment (a rarely successful defense). 
 
158 BGHSt32, 345, BGHStV 1989, 528; BGHStV 1994. 
159 Schaefer, Praxis der Strafzumessung, 2nd ed. (1995); von Stetten, Beweisverwertung beim Einsatz Verdeckter 
Ermittler, (1997). 
160 Interviews with German prosecutors, May 13, 18, and 19, 2004; Interview with supervisor in German covert 
policing unit, June 3, 2003. 
161 Interview with German deep cover agent, May 20, 2004. 
162 Interviews with German prosecutors, March 10 and May 13, 2004. 
163 Interview with German control officer, March 12, 2004. 
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The ability of entrapment doctrine to deliver on its promise—and the thus the legitimacy 
of covert practices, as measured by their congruence with norms against entrapment- depends on 
whether judges can learn about police influence on targets.  To what extend do the various 
encouragements offered and pressures exerted by agents reveal themselves in the criminal 
process?  The post-1992 system has unintentionally made it easier for police to keep their 
encouragements and pressures hidden.  The value of entrapment as a restraint on police has 
correspondingly diminished.   
 
Intelligence gathering investigations and the use of short-term operatives as adjuncts to 
deep cover agents have together shielded government influences from discovery.  As described 
above, the post-1992 system has devoted more attention to obtaining intelligence (as opposed to 
evidence for use in criminal proceedings).  If an investigation does not result in the prosecution 
of a target, the judiciary has little opportunity to learn what deep cover agents and informants 
did.  Even if it does yield a prosecution, the secrecy surrounding deep cover agents and 
informants, along with the difficulty of using intelligence as evidence, minimizes what judges 
can find out about operations in the field.  The inducements offered and threats made by agents 
and informants will remain unknown.  In addition, the police have developed strategies for using 
shallow cover agents to shield the tactics of deep cover agents and informants from judicial 
scrutiny.  Without judicial knowledge of covert practices, the entrapment doctrine loses some of 
its effectiveness as a tool for disciplining undercover tactics. 
 
C.  Retrofitting the Criteria of Success: Making the Crime Fit the Investigation 
 
The substantive norms rest upon an implicit model of proper policing.  Ideally, police 
should observe, prevent, or prosecute crimes whose existence does not depend in any way on 
their involvement.  On this view, crimes should arise independently.  The police should not 
pressure or induce targets to participate in crimes and certainly should not commit crimes 
themselves.  The ambiguities about what it means for agents to commit a “crime” or to induce 
targets to do so pose a challenge to this model of policing.  But there is another challenge.  
Undercover agents have a unique ability to define the central characteristics of the criminal 
organization they investigate; and to explain why they infiltrated it based on what they learn 
once they are there.  The organization whose crimes ultimately justifies the deployment of 
undercover operatives is not one operating “independently” from the police; for that is largely 
hidden from the legal system.  The one that legitimates the use of covert methods is the one 
observed—and influenced—by agents and informants.  They do not merely react to criminal 
organizations; they shape them, or at least shape how the organizations are described.  As a 
result, undercover policing has a unique ability to retrofit criteria of success.  After agents 
manipulate targets and events, and the description of targets and events, they can define the 
threat that needed to be solved with infiltration.  They can make the crime fit the investigation.  
Judges and politicians commonly lack an independent picture of the criminal organization under 
investigation that can allow them to assess the effectiveness and accomplishments of undercover 
policing.  This creates a legitimation problem for covert policing as a practice, even though—
indeed, because—it can find ways to justify each investigation. 
 
German investigations of organized crime illustrate these general observations.  The 
German undercover policing system expanded and took its recent form in reaction to a perceived 
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upsurge of organized crime in the 1980s and early 1990s.  The 1992 statute did not define 
organized crime.  Prosecutors and police have adopted one from a 1990 regulation promulgated 
to facilitate cooperation in the investigation of organized crime.164 The regulation styles 
“organized” crime as “the planned commission of offenses of considerable significance, for 
profit or power, by two or more participants working together, dividing their labors and using 
guild- or business-like structures, or resorting to violence or other intimidation…or exerting 
influence on politics, media, public administration, justice, or the economy.”165 The criteria 
defining “organized crime” were manifold, including “structured, hierarchical organizations, 
often supported by ethnic solidarity, language, custom, social and family connections,” and a 
catalogue of more than a dozen different areas of criminal activity included narcotics trafficking, 
arms dealing, prostitution, gambling, alien smuggling, counterfeiting, and burglary, theft, and 
fencing rings.166 The regulation did not insist that an “organized” criminal gang fit all of these 
criteria.  The gang only needed to match some of the many different possibilities. 
 
Aside from the 1990 regulation, German law offered one other resource for defining 
organized criminal organizations.  The criminal code defined an offense called “criminal 
association.”167 Yet few criminal organizations could qualify since the code demanded high 
levels of complexity and permanency.  “What makes it so difficult to prove is that the association 
has to have a hierarchy with multiple people at the top; a pyramid doesn’t qualify.”168 “A 
criminal association has to have a permanent command structure, and an established process of 
decisionmaking for the organization as a whole.  It really only applies to already recognized 
entities like the Cosa Nostra and Nhdragheta.”169 For that reason, “although criminal association 
is our only organized crime offense, it’s almost never used.  Mostly, we charge it only for 
terrorism offenses.  When we do use that section of the code, it’s mostly to get approval for 
telephone tapping and other covert tactics; but that’s pretty controversial, because everyone 
knows we won’t actually charge the offense.”170 
Given the strict requirements of the criminal code, prosecutors typically rely on the more 
elastic 1990 regulation.  Many criminal organizations fit some, but not all, of the criteria laid out 
in the 1990 regulation.  As a result, the police have great discretion in defining which criminal 
gangs are “organized,” and which not.171 “Organized crime can be anything.  Once I 
 
164 Gemeinsame Richtlinien der Justizminister/-senatoren und der Innenminister/-senatoren der Laender ueber die 
Zusammenarbeit von Staatsanwaltschaft und Polizei bei der Verfolgung der Organisierten Kriminalitaet; 15 RiStBV 
Anl. E.; See also Gemeinsame Richtlinien der Justizminister/-senatoren und der Innenminister/-senatoren der 
Laender ueber die Inanspruchnahme von Informanten sowie ueber den Einsatz von Vertrauenspersonen (V-
Personen) und Verdeckten Ermittlern im Rahmen der Strafverfolgung, 15 RiStBV Anl. D (1985, amended 1993 and 
1994). 
165 Id. 
166The 1990 regulation laid the groundwork for an expansion of undercover policing, and for an emphasis on 
intelligence-gathering, by calling for the of the sixteen states to conduct and work together on “proactive 
investigations” of organized crime in the preventive realm of police activity, for the purpose of “collecting 
information” that would spur more targeted probes.   
167 StGB 129. 
168 Interview with German prosecutor, March 12, 2004. 
169 Interview with German prosecutor, March 10, 2004. 
170 Interview with German prosecutor, May 19, 2004. 
171 The 1992 statute built the legitimacy of undercover policing around its usefulness in investigating organized 
crime.  Thus it essentially entrusted the definition of the problem to the police. 
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investigated a gang of students who regularly used public transportation without paying the fare.  
This, too, was organized crime, because they had developed a system for insuring their members 
against fines; everyone paid some amount into a common pot, and if they got caught, the 
organization would pay the fine.”172 
This control over the concept of “organized crime” also allows investigators to 
circumvent constraints imposed by the 1992 statute.  The statute tried to legitimate undercover 
operations by limiting them to a list of enumerated crimes and to a residual category, the “serious 
crime.”  The police can justify a covert investigation by styling the target as an “organized” 
entity, which suggest that its crimes are sufficiently “serious” to qualify under the statute.  A 
prosecutor explained that “cigarette smuggling is not actually a predicate offense of deep cover 
operations.  But you can still get approval if you can show that the smuggling operation is an 
organized endeavor, with some of the characteristics listed in the regulation.”173 In deciding 
whether a criminal venture qualifies as “organized,” the police can emphasize those 
characteristics of organized crime that covert operations are well-equipped to detect.  “There 
may be one guy falsifying vehicle documents, another guy repainting the cars, and a third guy 
driving them across the border.  You get an undercover agent to offer logistical services.  He 
rents them a hall, or a vehicle with false compartments.  He offers to drive the vehicles, offers to 
provide some couriers, offers to get them the phone and a bunch of false documents, bribe the 
Customs officials, and now we know how they operate.”174 
Police not only interpret the definition of organized crime to justify their covert 
investigations.  Occasionally they also manipulate the targets so that their activities look more 
like those of “organized” criminals.  One indicator of organized crime is its ability to forge links 
to lawful realms of society.  Undercover agents sometimes supply those links.  “The criminals 
come to see you as their connection to that normal, outside world.  Now you can make yourself 
useful to them, offer them services.”175 Deep cover agents could make themselves interesting to 
targets by pretending to have friends inside the Customs Service who could help people avoid 
border controls.176 Others offered referrals to banks, lawyers, tax consultants, foreign contacts, 
and special airport access.177 One official described an investigation in which the police had 
established a German distribution network for a Latin American cocaine organization that was 
seeking to gain a foothold in Germany.  “The investigators in that case founded a whole front 
business for the group, transported the drugs for them, and even solicited customers.”178 Another 
official described an operation in which he provided a foreign gang with a combination of office 
space, banking connections, credit cards, transport, and storage space—in effect supplying many 
of the links between the legal and illegal realms that the 1990 regulation views as characteristic 
of organized crime and without which the gang might not have been successful in bringing their 
 
172 Interview with supervisor of German covert policing unit, May 26, 2003. 
173 Interview with German prosecutor, March 11, 2004. 
174 Interview with supervisor of German covert policing unit, June 2, 2003. 
175 Interview with German control officer and former deep cover agent, May 13, 2004. 
176 Interview with supervisor of German covert policing unit, May 27, 2003. 
177 Interview with German deep cover agent, May 12, 2004; Interview with supervisor in covert policing unit, June 
2, 2003. 
178 Interview with German prosecutor, May 21, 2004. 
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business to Germany.179 The link between gangs and lawful society that suggests “organized” 
criminal capacity can sometimes be an artifact of the investigation.   
Another way in which undercover investigations can construct features characteristic of 
organized crime is by linking different gangs.  A number of prosecutors and police officials 
described how covert agents or informants forged connections between different gangs and 
thereby turned their joint activities into more complex, organized crimes.  “We once looked at 
some guys in Yugoslavia who had guns and wanted drugs.  The covert agent was part of a drug 
organization in England that was looking for guns.  The agent organized a meeting; but 
otherwise, really, these guys would never have met.”180 In another case, “an informant had met a 
Colombian in jail. We wanted to have the informant make arrangements to buy some drugs from 
the guy in Colombia, once they both got out.  But the prosecutor balked and wouldn’t finance the 
deal.  So without money, we did something else.  The informant had some contacts with a ring of 
Polish car thieves.   The informant hooked the Polish car thieves up with the Colombian drug 
dealers, and in no time, the Poles sent cars to Colombia and got loads of cocaine in exchange. 
Everyone was happy.”181 From the perspective of the police, forging connections between gangs 
or between gangs and lawful society helped undercover operatives avoid direct participation in 
the crimes they investigated.  But these links help create the organizational complexity that the 
investigation was designed to prove and that justified the operation.   
 
The role of the police in forging (as well as discovering) organizational complexity may 
not always come out at trial.  By using short-term shallow cover agents in the final stages of an 
investigation, the police may shield from discovery the role that deep cover agents played in 
forging links between targets and between targets and lawful society.  Deep cover investigations 
provide the police with specific and comprehensive inside knowledge—but at the cost of 
necessitating a degree of secrecy about sources that makes much of that information unavailable 
to the trier of fact.  Courts reconstruct the context of defendants’ actions from highly selective 
evidence that omits much background information about how the police came to focus on 
particular targets, what was known about them in advance, how the government steered or 
assisted them, and which features of their crimes reflect the targets’ own capabilities (as opposed 
the government’s influence).   
 
Given that police, at their discretion, can broadly interpret the definition of organized 
crime and can manipulate targets to better resemble “organized” criminals—what follows?  If the 
government can shape the phenomena, and the description of the phenomena, to justify their 
investigations, what does this implications does this have for the way in which the police 
operate?  To begin with, it means that undercover operations do not confine themselves to 
criminal milieus.  They bring within their ambit both lawful society and criminal networks.  
Deep cover agents (and informants) are permanent fixtures in cafes, bars, restaurants, hotels, and 
other ordinary establishments, particularly those frequented by immigrants, where they rub 
 
179 Interview with supervisor of covert policing unit on May 27, 2003.
180 Interview with former chief of covert policing unit, June 3, 2003. 
181 Interview with German control officer, May 27, 2003.  Other police officials and one prosecutor also mentioned 
cases in which undercover operatives had connected groups of sellers with buyers or with providers of logistical 
services.   
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shoulders with law-abiding citizens along with the assorted mopes, hangers-on, occasional 
offenders, and committed criminals whom they collectively designate as “targets.”   
 
The government’s power to shape the description of organized crime has exacerbated the 
gap between the goals that legitimate undercover work and the day-to-day practice of it.  The 
1992 statute authorized undercover policing in order to turn it into an effective tool against 
organized crime.  The government’s ability to creatively describe organized crime, to direct 
operations against targets they are good at detecting, and to retrofit definitions of success in order 
to accord with what investigation turn up have hidden costs.  Police shy away from hard-to-
penetrate organized crime networks while arresting easy-to-find small fish for the sake of 
impressive “stats.” A police official saw the criminal code and the culture of prosecutors as two 
of the culprits.  “Organized crime involves complicated structures; but the criminal code ties us 
to the elements of individual crimes.  Sure we look at international connections and money 
flows.  But we focus too much on individual offenders; and prosecutors aim too exclusively at 
the individual offense.  We [covert agents] are essentially a service provider and are therefore 
dependent on others to come to us with requests for assistance.  For example, I could imagine 
planting someone in a grouping of con-artists, maybe having him defraud another undercover 
agent to find out the channels through which they operate.  But probing deeply into criminal 
structures is hard, and the prosecutors want immediate results.  One can demonstrate profit 
motives and find loose groupings of criminals.  We can’t sell prosecutors on longer, more in-
depth kinds of investigation.”182 
This development is reminiscent of the tendency David Garland observes in The Culture 
of Control.183 Garland argued that American and British police agencies have responded to their 
inability to combat rising crime rates by revising performance measures from outcomes to 
outputs.  In Garland’s account, the police focus on seizures and arrests in place of lowered crime 
rates (which are harder to produce and control).  German covert policing units are moving farther 
into the realm of controllable performance measures by shifting emphasis from the goal 
imagined by the 1992 statute (less organized crime in society) to the sorts of easily quantifiable 
outputs which transactional sting operations are reliably able to produce.      
 
The pressure for “stats” and quick results encouraged police to charge discrete, easily 
provable offenses.  But undercover investigations often yield far more information about 
criminal organizations then the government needs to prove these mundane, relatively 
unsophisticated offenses at trial.  What becomes of this intelligence?  The specialized divisions 
within federal and state prosecutors’ offices and police agencies dedicated to investigating 
organized crime use it to create “Lagebilder” (descriptions of criminal organizations and their 
goings-on based upon intelligence gathered in a variety of reports).184 The stated purpose of the 
“Lagebilder” is to create a fund of knowledge useful in supporting prosecutions and thereby 
reducing organized crime.  But to some extent, the drive to make “Lagebilder” more capacious, 
 
182 Interview with chief of German covert policing unit, March 10, 2004. 
183 David Garland, The Culture of Control (2001). 
184 Interview with German prosecutor, March 10, 2004.  Which organizations do the police target when assembling 
a Lagebild?  “We look for established, ongoing criminal structures which display a strong profit motive and will to 
power, a sophisticated division of labor, organized like a business, perhaps with influence on politics, the legal 
system, or the economy.” Id. 
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subtle, and precise takes on a life of its own.  Thus the structure of the German undercover 
policing system supports the accumulation of knowledge at some remove from the prosecution 
of criminals.   
That there is a gap between the day-to-day practices of an institution and the goals that 
justified its creation is not, in itself, surprising.  What is interesting about undercover policing is 
the significant empirical and conceptual difficulties of assessing the relationship between what 
the covert system does and what it is supposed to do (reduce entrenched organized crime).  As I 
have argued, the power of police and prosecutors to interpret the definition of organized crime, 
to steer targets, and to characterize the information obtained by agents means that the undercover 
policing system commonly makes what it discovers look like what it set out to find.  By 
retrofitting criteria of success, the system minimizes its rate of “failure.”  It further protects its 
aura of accomplishment by valorizing “craft skills” (such as analysis of intelligence and dexterity 
in infiltration) when outcomes are disappointing.   
 
What the system does not see also preserves its aura.  Police supervisors speak ruefully of 
complex organized crime networks that have not been infiltrated because of  difficulty or the 
pressure for “stats.” 185 Without an agent in place to assess the extent and destructiveness of 
these networks, their existence does not impinge as much as it might on the system’s assessment 
of its success.  Criminal networks that the police do not succeed in infiltrating may escape the 
system’s notice as a problem it needs to address.  Thus a prosecutor explained that, from his 
perspective, “there’s no organized crime without an undercover agent.”186 The way that covert 
policing measures and creates knowledge about crime makes it difficult for judges, legislators, 
and the public to determine to what extent undercover operations address the organized crime 
problem that justified those operations in the first place.  How can outsiders test claims about the 
pervasiveness of organized crime and the success of covert methods that have been made to 
justify the expansion of undercover policing?  This is of particular concern because legitimacy is 
cast into doubt whenever an institution controls the criteria by which the utility of its powers is 
judged.  The manipulation of performance measures is a problem for the legitimation of 
undercover policing in other legal system as well.  But it is a special problem in Germany, 
insofar as Germany, unlike the United States, has sought to limit deep cover operations to only 
the most serious offenses, while giving the police considerable discretion in identifying such 
offenses.  The police can subtly fit ends to means.  They can describe what they are looking for 
(say, organized crime) in ways that match what they are best at finding.   
 
VII. Conclusion, Part I: Four Senses of Covert Surveillance as a “Necessary Evil” 
 
Germany and the United States both regard undercover policing as a necessary evil.  But 
they mean different things by this.  Let us consider four senses in which Germany views 
undercover policing as a necessary evil—and contrast these to American conceptions of the 
moral and legal compromises that covert policing entails.  The first two senses capture the 
conflict of covert policing with entrenched constitutional values.  These conceptions of covert 
policing treat it as problematic because it compromises the rights of targets and erodes several  
constitutionally mandated walls between different powers of the executive.   The other two 
 
185 Interview with chief of German covert policing unit, March 10, 2004. 
186 Interview with German prosecutor, March 10, 2004. 
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senses in which infiltration constitutes a necessary evil depend on viewing it as intrinsically in 
tension with German conceptions of the rule of law and constraints on the exercise of 
government power.   Under these two conceptions, undercover policing undermines compliance 
with the duties or role obligations of government actors and jeopardizes the integrity of the 
police.   By contrast, the American regulatory system does not view covert operations as 
intrinsically problematic but as dangerous only when abused.  Along with the misuse of 
infiltration to entrap the innocent, problems of control and accountability are the main objects of 
American concern.   
 
To understand the distinctive dilemmas that undercover policing poses for Germany, it is 
necessary to appreciate the way in which the intelligence operations of Germany’s APCs shape 
and color German fears about infiltration when used as a law enforcement tactic.  The revelations 
about intelligence infiltration of the NDP and the resulting failure of the government’s attempts 
to outlaw the party dramatically illustrated the risks to the state of entangling government agents 
with extremist organizations (or, by extension, with organized crime.)  The scandal highlighted, 
first and foremost, the problem of government influence, whose counterpart in criminal 
investigations is the danger of entrapment.  The problem with the NDP investigation was not, of 
course, that it corrupted the innocent.  But the APCs’ extensive infiltration of the party 
leadership raised the larger question: to what extent was the extremist character of the NDP the 
product of a symbiosis between government informants and “genuine” neo-Nazis?  Did it makes 
things better or worse for the government that several of its informants in the party’s top 
echelons had been terminated as informants because the eluded control by their handlers?  Since 
the renegades were “genuine racists and anti-semites,” could their words and deeds fairly be 
credited to the party which they helped lead?    
 
That informants had drafted some of the rhetoric cited in the government’s petition 
against the party raised related concerns about the official involvement in the core of the party’s 
most objectionable activities—that is, about law-breaking by government actors.  This was more 
than a scruple about the state dirtying its hands; the authorship of newspapers and pamphlets 
went directly to the question of who was responsible for what the party did.  The ensuing scandal 
seemed to incorporate all the elements that make infiltration troublesome, in both the intelligence 
and law enforcement context.  It highlighted not only the problems of influence on and undue 
involvement in prohibited activity.  It also illuminated the dangers of losing control over 
operatives in the field.  And it revealed the difficulties of coordinating parallel intelligence 
investigations in a decentralized system of political surveillance, since, the participating APCs 
had not known the identity of each other’s informants and had mistaken them for genuine 
exponents of the party line.  (That’s how the informants’ published sayings found their way into 
the government’s petition.)  Indeed, though the party was not prosecuted under the criminal laws, 
the scandal even highlighted risks to constitutionally protected trial rights.   For the state did not 
deactivate its informants after filing its petition to ban the NDP; this gave infiltrators access to 
the party’s strategy in defending against the petition (though the APC denied seeking such 
information.)   
 
But perhaps what was most troubling about the scandal—and what makes infiltration a 
“necessary evil”—is that it was not at all clear, even after the fact, what the APCs could have 
done differently, given their responsibility for monitoring groups like the NDP.  The APCs 
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discouraged informants from seeking high leadership positions in the NDP; when the informants 
did so anyway, the APCs deactivated them (though they did maintain contact with them 
afterwards.) Nor could the APCs easily have recruited informants from outside the neo-Nazi 
milieu to work within the party long-term—which of course entailed a risk that their operatives 
would go astray or would participate too actively and enthusiastically in the party’s activities.  
And the problems of coordination and overlap by different APCs arose directly from the 
decentralized structure of German intelligence agencies—a conscious choice in the post-war 
attempt to avoid dangerous concentrations of power.   
 
There were other reasons why it was to some extent unavoidable that the use of 
infiltrators would infect the legal proceedings against the party.   Once the intelligence services’ 
informants were in place, it would have been difficult to extricate them from the party after the 
government filed its formal petition to ban the NDP.  Not only would this have been impossible 
with those former informants who had become renegades; but withdrawing informants from the 
NDP would have allowed the party to identify the turncoats.  Withdrawing APC informants 
would also have deprived the APCs of their ability to monitor what the party was doing, and to 
prevent acts of violence, during the pendency of the proceedings.   It also was not possible for 
the government to identify the informants to the court without telling the NDP—such an ex parte 
proceeding would have violated their right to represent themselves and respond to the 
government’s petition.   As one APC official complained bitterly, “there seems to be a conflict 
between surveilling [the party] and banning it,” since each made the other virtually 
impossible.187 The popular press did not fail to notice that the government’s extensive 
infiltration--and the failure of its petition to ban the party—led to unprecedented electoral gains 
for this and other extreme right-wing parties in subsequent elections to state legislatures.188 
These dilemmas were not lost on critics of undercover policing.  But while German 
undercover policing suffers from the comparison to the work of intelligence agencies, American 
intelligence work benefits from the comparison to police work, and, indeed, derives its 
legitimacy from adherence to the “criminal standard.” Such a standard is unavailable to 
Germany, which prohibits its intelligence agencies from enforcing the criminal laws.  Germany 
gives its intelligence agencies wider scope to investigate inchoate threats and to infiltrate 
political organizations.   But the resulting dilemmas and occasional scandals have shaped the 
problems of legitimacy for infiltration as a police tactic and have given content to these four 
different senses of the practice as a necessary evil.    
 
Each of the four senses in which undercover policing is a “necessary evil” reflects 
distinct concerns and compromises, and each of these dilemmas has a counterpart in Germany’s 
experience with infiltration as an intelligence tactic.   Different though the “evils” of undercover 
tactics may be, the sense of necessity is common to all four conceptions.   What is meant is not
that undercover policing is necessary (e.g. as a tool against organized crime), but that the darker 
aspects of this practice—the “evils” or social costs they impose—are to some extent inescapable 
if the system is to use such tactics at all.  To understand why the compromises on which covert 
policing rests create special problems of legitimacy in Germany, it is important to appreciate the 
shape which necessary evils take in the realm of political policing.  Discerning the different ways 
 
187 Spiegel, 20/2002. 
188 Spiegel, 20/2002; 5/2002; “Nazis with a bouncing tent,” Spiegel 40/04 at 44;  
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in which undercover policing may be thought of as a necessary evil also helps explain why the 
United States is much more apt to celebrate the exploits of undercover agents and why the 
legitimacy of undercover policing remains more elusive in Germany.   
 
A.  Adverse Impact on Privacy and Other Constitutional Rights
In Germany, undercover policing is a necessary evil in that it harms targets by invading 
their constitutionally protected right to privacy, along with other fundamental rights.  Such 
privacy concerns were particularly salient when political groups were infiltrated, because 
informants of the APCs and of the police “state security” units were sometimes criticized as 
indiscriminate in their targeting of left-wing student groups.189 One German magazine explicitly 
linked undercover policing to political infiltration, claiming that “the police will in the future use 
secret service methods to pursue drug dealers—but other, innocent people will also be 
affected.”190 German law responds to these concerns through legislation that carves out special 
limitations on the most intrusive covert tactics, namely long-term deep cover operations.  
Viewing covert policing as an invasion of privacy assimilates it to other police powers, like 
searches and seizures.  While these tactics burden civil liberties, they do so permissibly, through 
police compliance with procedural constraints such as warrant requirements.  Because civil 
liberties may lawfully be compromised in the name of security, thinking of covert surveillance as 
invasions of privacy allows the legal system to justify the burdens that covert policing imposes 
on rights.  This regulatory approach also entails the use of procedural constraints on how covert 
tactics may be authorized, alongside substantive limits on what undercover operatives may do. 
 
German privacy law protects dignitary interests, while American conceptions of privacy 
emphasize physical privacy in the home along with decisional privacy or autonomy.  Germany’s 
concern with individual dignity is part of the German Constitution’s concern with safeguarding 
the “free development of personality,” in direct reaction to the totalitarian oppression and 
violations of personal dignity under the Nazi regime.  Invasions of privacy also have special 
salience for residents of the five new eastern states who remember the encompassing 
surveillance practiced more recently in the GDR.   Given these concerns, police infiltration is 
deeply problematic.  It interferes with the rights of all persons to control the face they present to 
the world; to reveal too much about the intimate details of a person’s life; and to disrupt personal 
relationships.  Giving constitutional status to these harms means that the government must satisfy 
certain requirements before inflicting them.   Constitutional protection entails a warrant 
procedure, a showing of need, and statutory limits on the crimes that the government may target 
in this way. 
 
By contrast, the United States legal system does not treat undercover policing as an 
intrinsic invasion of privacy rights. Undercover policing is not recognized as a search or seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.191 Because they have no Fourth Amendment significance, 
undercover investigations require no warrant and no showing of probable cause or even 
 
189 “Undercover student,” Spiegel 30/03 at 41; “Undercover agents recalled; surveillance of left-wing groups 
halted,” FAZ August 5, 1992, at 4; ; “Spaetzle-Stasi,” Spiegel 35/92 at 86. 
190 Spiegel 24/90 at 32. 
191 The weighing of costs and benefits is entrusted entirely to the executive and remains judicially unreviewable. 
50
reasonable suspicion as a matter of constitutional law.192 Absent a legally recognized impact on 
constitutional rights, American undercover tactics need not be reserved for a subset of serious 
crimes, or for those categories of cases in which conventional tactics would not work.   Indeed, 
in the United States, the use of covert tactics is sometimes celebrated for their leveling effects on 
the pursuit of elite and non-elite offenders.  Privacy protections, of course, disproportionately 
benefit those offenders who are able to interpose lawyers between themselves and the coercive 
apparatus of government.  Like other covert alternatives to coercion, police infiltration can level 
the playing field.    
 
Germany’s distinctive concern about rights gives rise to special problems of legitimacy.   
Since Germany protects privacy by limiting deep cover operations, critics have a foundation for 
mounting new legal challenges to undercover policing.  These include challenges to less 
regulated undercover tactics, like the deployment of informants or “shallow-cover” agents, 
whose use also burdens privacy, or to the inadequacy of confrontation rights for criminal 
defendants.  Thus, once the legal system recognizes undercover policing as a problem for 
fundamental rights, and provides protections for some of these, new conflicts with higher-order 
norms may emerge, as other rights are invoked.  This in turn imperils the legitimacy of 
undercover investigations along the second dimension of “legitimacy as fit;” the congruence of 
the practice with other basic norms.     
 
Subject matter constraints give rise to different concerns about deep cover investigations.  
Because Germany treats undercover policing as intrusions on privacy, it permits such operations 
only against the most serious offenses, particularly organized crime.  Ordinary offenses are 
simply not sufficiently dangerous to warrant such invasive tactics.  But this justification allows 
for skepticism about whether the networks against which deep cover operations are deployed 
really fit the description of “organized crime.” What makes the success of undercover 
investigations so difficult to assess is that infiltrators influence the organizations they infiltrate, 
and possess power to define what constitutes organized crime and thus to fit what they find to 
what they were looking for.   Lawmakers therefore lack a truly independent yardstick for 
measuring the accomplishments of undercover stings.  Under the model of legitimacy-as-fit, the 
legitimacy of a regulated practice depends on the extent to which it serves  the ends—such as 
fighting organized crime—in whose name the practice was authorized.  The possibility of 
evaluating the success of covert policing in fighting organized crime therefore depends on the 
possibility of evaluating the results of undercover stings – the crimes uncovered—according to 
some criteria not wholly in the control of the police.193 
These kinds of challenges are largely missing from the American scene.  In part, of 
course, this is due to the fact that American undercover agents are expected to testify.  But few 
other constitutional claims have been vindicated.  In theory, defendants may invoke substantive 
due process rights to challenge undercover tactics that “shock the conscience” and violate 
“fundamental fairness.”  And after the government brings formal charges, a target’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel ensure his protection against undercover questioning, at least about 
the crimes with which he is charged.  But this leaves the government significant leeway, even 
 
192 However, the police may need evidence of “predisposition” to rebut a claim of entrapment.  
193 Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation, 1970)(emphasizing the importance of independent 
performance measures to the legitimacy of institutions.) 
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after indictment, and even in prison.  And absent egregious misconduct, constitutional claims 
against undercover tactics rarely succeed. In the United States, the language of rights has rarely 
provided a salient or successful model for challenging undercover stings.   
 
B.  Systemic Effects: Undercover Policing and the Separation of Powers
There is a second sense in which Germany sees undercover policing as a necessary evil.  
Covert operations erode distinctions between “preventive” and “repressive” powers of the police, 
and between the collection of evidence and pursuit of intelligence.  This parallel system of 
regulation means that the police can conduct undercover investigations in either their 
exploratory, danger-preventing capacity or in their crime-solving mode, depending on whether 
they have developed enough specifics about a planned offense to launch a regular criminal 
investigation.  But when the police infiltrate organizations for crime prevention purposes, they 
may not gather evidence. When they do conduct covert operations in their law enforcement 
capacity, they may only gather evidence--as opposed to intelligence about risks that have not yet 
matured.  Problems arise because the nominal pursuit of evidence can spur the pursuit of 
intelligence—particularly with the advent of the reforms that authorized deep cover units and 
created specialized covert units. 
 
Concerns that preventive undercover investigations may become too much like 
intelligence operations embody fears that the preventive investigations may be tempt the police, 
like the APCs, to forego taking action against lawbreakers for the sake of keeping their 
operatives in place.  The popular press has repeatedly published exposes alleging that the APCs 
have protected well-placed informants by allowing neo-Nazi groups to produce soundtracks and 
operate unimpeded.194 One such story claimed that the APCs had failed to pass along evidence 
of a murder committed by a neo-Nazi group, though their informant had obtained the murder 
weapon from and had obtained incriminating admissions from those who committed it.195 
Undercover policing could lend itself to similar abuses once its object became intelligence, rather 
than evidence.    
 
The confluence between covert police work and intelligence gathering has generated a 
great deal of controversy about the whether covert methods violate the principle of separation 
between the intelligence and law enforcement prerogatives; about the constitutional status of the 
principle of separation; and about its continuing vitality as a constraint on executive power.  
Memories of the ways in which the Stasi used its covert powers in the former GDR only 
increased unease about the potential misuse of deep cover investigations as a method of social 
control.   But there are no ready means of reconciling covert tactics with the requirements of 
federalism or the principle of separation of intelligence and police agencies.  While constitutional 
rights may be traded off against law enforcement imperatives, there is no analogous repertoire of 
interest-balancing justifications and warrant procedures for compromising these functional 
divisions of government.  If the regulatory system permits seventeen domestic intelligence 
agencies to infiltrate criminal and terrorist networks parallel to similar efforts by seventeen state 
police forces and the federal BKA, it must accept redundancy and functional overlap.  It must 
tolerate some confluence of preventive and repressive operations.   And it must derogate from 
 
194 “Professional Rambos,”Spiegel 33/02. 
195 “The Victory of the Informant,” Spiegel 19/02 at 50. 
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the principle of separation between intelligence services and police, or else reinterpret that 
requirement.    
 
To accept undercover policing as a necessary evil in this second sense is to confront not 
only concrete harms to the constitutional rights of identified targets but also diffuse harms 
through the dilution of principles that structure government.   Under the theory of legitimacy-as-
fit, this “necessary evil” embodies a problematic mismatch between undercover policing and the 
fundamental demands that Germany’s legal system places on the organization and differentiation 
of executive powers.   This tension is unavoidable to the extent that undercover investigations 
intrinsically blur the line between preventing future crimes and proving past ones and resists neat 
distinctions between evidence and intelligence.  This erosion of boundaries is most severe for 
deep cover operations.    
 
That undercover policing generates intelligence along with evidence is of less concern in 
the United States, which requires the FBI to investigate domestic security threats alongside its 
law enforcement mission.  Controversies about the FBI’s role in infiltrating religious and 
political organizations domestically have focused on the misuse of that power against peaceful 
organizations; on the effect of such surveillance on the exercise of First Amendment rights; and 
the instigation of crimes by agents provocateurs.  This was less a concern about the relationship 
between the law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities of the FBI than a direct critique of 
the way in which the FBI carried the latter of these missions.  The Department of Justice 
curtailed these abuses through the Levi Guidelines of 1976, which limited the FBI’s domestic 
security investigations by permitting the FBI to target only those organizations that pursued a 
violent agenda.  By contrast, Germany’s domestic intelligence agencies have enjoyed a wider 
authority to infiltrate  extremist organizations, without needing to demonstrate a link to violent 
criminal activity.196 Germany’s greater willingness to deploy intelligence agencies domestically 
arose partly from the desire to catch future Nazis in the Beer Hall stage and partly in reaction to 
the Cold War and the Federal Republic’s tense relationship with the GDR.   
 
As we have seen in Section V.B.4, American concerns about the undercover operations 
focus less on the proper demarcation between law enforcement and intelligence investigations 
than on the question of what the proper ambit of domestic intelligence investigations should be.  
Thus, American concerns about the legitimacy of such operations focus largely on First 
Amendment concerns, as a counterpart to Germany’s solicitude for individual privacy. American 
domestic security investigations become less legitimate – more intrusive on First Amendment 
rights -- to the extent they stray from the criminal standard and the law enforcement model and 
set their sights on political or religious organizations that have not yet manifested involvement in 
criminal activity.  To the extent the United States has worried about the relationship between 
intelligence gathering and law enforcement, it has focused on the interaction between the FBI’s 
law enforcement mission, on the one hand, and its foreign intelligence and foreign 
counterintelligence responsibilities on the other.  Through the Gorelick memorandum, the United 
States formalized the long-standing practice of walling foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence investigations off from law enforcement probes.  But this separation had 
 
196 However, scandals like those surrounding the investigation of the NDP have raised challenges to the use of 
infiltrators as agents provocateurs, to the saturation of leadership positions with infiltrators, and to the lack of 
coordination between Germany’s seventeen domestic intelligence agencies.     
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more to do with the regulation of electronic surveillance than with undercover investigations per 
se (and has, like the Levi limits on domestic infiltration, been repudiated, in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks.)197 In the United States, the last remaining “wall” is that between the 
domestic intelligence community and the military because the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the 
domestic deployment of the armed forces.  But this has few implications for the use of 
undercover tactics by American law enforcement agencies.  The resemblance of Germany’s deep 
cover policing tactics to the methods of German domestic intelligence agencies poses a 
fundamental and continuing challenge to the legitimacy of covert operations--one which has no 
real counterpart in the American legal context.198 
C.  The Impact on the Duties and Roles of Government Officials
Undercover policing not only challenges constitutional values, including individual rights 
and separation of powers.   It also stands in tension with Germany’s conception of the rule of law 
and what this requires of government actors.  The third and fourth senses in which undercover 
policing is a “necessary evil” for Germany flow from this conflict.  Mindful of Nazi crimes, the 
German understanding of the rule of law prohibits covert operatives from committing offenses, 
even when they do so for investigative purposes.  Yet undercover agents and informants must act 
like “criminals.”  Likewise, covert operations require the police to remain passive while targets 
commit crimes in order to gather evidence and to avoid terminating the investigation 
prematurely.  Yet the principle of legality may require investigators to intervene.  Undercover 
stings require operatives to offer their targets opportunities and enticements. Yet Germany 
prohibits entrapment, while treating all undercover investigations as involving some degree of it.  
The principle of legality and the substantive norms derive from Germany conceptions of the rule 
of law and what it requires of the police.  The legal system defines departures from the principle 
of legality and the substantive norms as improper—as derogating from the duties and acceptable 
roles of government officials—even as the system commits itself to a tactic that necessarily 
requires departures.  Undercover policing may be viewed as a necessary evil to the extent that its 
success requires and depends on deviation from these norms. 
 
Germany’s uncompromising norms help legitimate undercover policing by distinguishing 
it from the work of Germany’s intelligence agencies.   The APCS, which are exempt from the 
principle of legality tolerating illegal activity and allowing informants to participate actively in 
crimes, have been criticized, and not only during the NDP scandal, for tolerating illegal activity 
 
197 The “wall” was motivated by the Justice Department’s concern that information obtained through FISA warrants 
would not be usable as evidence, and might taint the FBI’s law enforcement mission, if courts determined that the 
FBI had used FISA procedure to circumvent the federal warrant procedure that governed law enforcement wiretaps.  
Since undercover policing required no warrant, there was no analogous concern that the use of covert operatives in 
intelligence operations could be used to circumvent constraints on the use of infiltrators in criminal investigations.  
Of course, if infiltrators who worked on foreign intelligence investigations were expected to remain secret, using 
their insights in criminal investigations created a risk that their identity might become known.  
198 Indeed, American critics have complained that the FBI’s counterintelligence program has been too heavily 
influenced by its law enforcement ethos, focusing too much on gathering evidence of past assaults and too little on 
the prevention of future ones.  Whatever problems this may pose for domestic intelligence work, it does little to 
undermine the legitimacy of infiltration as police work.   Thus, while Germany worries about the police becoming 
too much like its domestic intelligence agencies, the U.S. has the opposite worry, namely a concern that the FBI’s 
intelligence operations being too influenced by its law enforcement mission.    
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and for allowing their informants to participate actively in crimes--—for example by producing 
and distributing neo-Nazi soundtracks and song collections,  writing racist tracts (and, as one 
article claimed, allowing an informant to assist  in the murder of a suspected turncoat.)199 More 
problematically, the NDP scandal highlighted the ways in which infiltration can create or at least 
exacerbate what it seeks to expose.  Thus Germany’s experience with political infiltration may 
have reinforced legislators’ unwillingness to provide operatives with leeway to commit or 
tolerate crimes.  And to the extent Germany draws its conception of undercover policing from 
the activities of its intelligence agencies, its expansive notions of entrapment in the criminal law 
may owe something to long-standing concerns about political infiltration and its diffuse and 
distorting effects.     
 
In practice, police, prosecutors, and judges work together to mediate the conflicting 
demands of, on the one hand, the rule of law (as expressed through the principle of legality and 
the substantive norms) and, on the other hand, what undercover agents and informants must do 
for the sake of access and efficiency.  But the contrary demands placed on covert personnel can 
never be fully reconciled because there is a contradiction between what the system prohibits and 
what it not only tolerates but requires.  Judges, prosecutors and police invoke criminal law 
doctrines of intent, causation, duress, and necessity to distinguish the pretense of crime from the 
reality and thus to protect undercover agents from criminal liability.  They selectively suspend 
the pretense of complying with the substantive norms when the investigative stakes are high 
enough.  Insofar as the covert policing system depends on police, prosecutors and judges making 
such accommodations, the regulatory framework can be said to institutionalize ambivalence 
about the compromises intrinsic to covert policing—at once prohibiting compromises and 
depending on them.   Worse, the invisible nature of these accommodations rests on the unofficial 
exercise of discretion of prosecutors, undercover agents, and other police officials in setting the 
limits of what they will tolerate.  Such discretion is itself deeply problematic for a legal system 
committed to the principle of legality.   
 
The tension between the rule of law and covert policing poses problems for undercover 
operations in the United States – but less than in Germany.  FBI regulations allow undercover 
agents and informants to engage in “otherwise criminal activity” that has been properly 
authorized in advance.  The public authority defense bolsters this acceptance of what would 
otherwise be illegal conduct by giving police and informants alike a complete defense against 
criminal charges.  In the United States there is thus no case-by-case assessment of what 
undercover conduct is “really” criminal, in the manner that Koerner invoked.  Nor is there a 
principle of legality requiring the police to pursue all criminal cases.  Police and prosecutors 
have discretion in preferring charges and selecting whom to prosecute.   The entrapment doctrine 
applies only to the most egregious pressures or temptations.  There is therefore less tension in the 
United States between the official rules that govern covert policing and the practice on the 
ground, and therefore less of a concern about the legitimacy of these practices.200 American 
 
199 E. g. “Professional Rambo,” Spiegel 33/02 at 49; “Victory of an Informant,” see above. 
200 Nonetheless, even in the United States, there are limits to the leeway given to undercover agents and informants, 
and to prosecutors’ willingness to tolerate otherwise criminal conduct, moral hazards to operatives, and harms to 
third parties.  Likewise, substantive due process and the entrapment doctrine set outer limits on permissible degrees 
of government involvement in criminal activity and on acceptable incentives, opportunities, and assistance to the 
targets of government stings.     
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courts and commentators do not find it inherently troubling that undercover agents and 
informants can dangle temptations, or participate in some criminal activity, or allow crimes to go 
forward unimpeded so long as harm is prevented.  It is not the practice but the abuse of 
undercover tactics that generates concern.   
 
One might say that the United States applies a largely utilitarian calculus in deciding 
whether to tolerate otherwise criminal activity by its agents, informants, or its targets—subject, 
however, to a deontological override for some serious crimes that will not be allowed even if 
there is a net benefit to permitting them.  By contrast, Germany’s default rule is a deontological 
prohibition of criminal conduct.   Practitioners can manipulate that default rule using criminal 
law categories.  If those do not help, they can invoke a utilitarian override when the crimes being 
pursued are serious enough and the offenses being committed are relatively slight.  Both 
Germany and the United States compromise between the benefits of (selectively) permitting 
wrongdoing and the duty to limit wrongdoing.  But Germany’s uncompromising default rule 
makes the management of this conflict central to covert policing, and not merely an issue at the 
outer margins.  Moral compromise is at the heart of German practices.  This is true even though 
Germany permits less “criminal” activity by agents and informants than the United States 
because the substantive norms establish the default rule against which covert practices are 
judged.  The notion that covert operations bear an inevitable taint is central to Germany’s sense 
of undercover policing as a necessary evil. The unavoidable clash of covert policing with 
normative expectations creates a problem for the legitimacy of undercover operations.  The 
theory of legitimacy-as-fit identifies a legitimacy deficit whenever a police practice depends for 
its success on the creative reinterpretation and partial suspension of the ground rules of the 
criminal justice system. 
 
D. Risks of Abuse and Problems of Control
Both Germany and the United States view undercover policing as a necessary evil in an 
“actuarial” sense in that some significant probability of agents going astray must be factored into 
the social costs of the practice.  The risk of rogue agents is more significant, and the difficulties 
of guarding against it greater, for covert operations than for conventional policing.  There is, 
then, a pronounced tension between covert tactics  and the rule of law because of the inherent 
tendency of undercover policing to elude oversight and control and corrupt its practitioners.  
 
The “actuarial” risk derives from the close contacts between agents, informants, and 
targets.  Immersion in criminal milieus exposes agents to disorienting uncertainties about how to 
inhabit a role that requires them to become like their targets and makes it difficult for agents to 
distinguish between the person they are and the person they pretend to be.  Such confusions and 
conflicts of loyalties are even more severe for informants, whose identification with law 
enforcement objectives is both temporary and incomplete—subordinate, perhaps, to the aim of 
securing a lower sentence, earning a bounty, or putting rival offenders out of commission.  These 
moral hazards are important both to Germany and the United States.201 
201 Both legal systems address these concerns through improved means of selecting and training undercover agents.  
In the United States, reforms have centralized oversight of undercover investigations, made the FBI accountable to 
Congress for the successes and failures of their undercover operations, and sought to ensure that agents obtain 
proper authorization for otherwise criminal activity and for the ways in which they interact with informants.   
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Once again, however, the inherent difficulties of oversight have a special dimension in 
Germany.  First, it may be more difficult in Germany to determine what constitutes an abuse.  In 
responding to Koriath’s “confession,” Koerner justified the ban on undercover law-breaking by 
listing a variety of past abuses whose recurrence the substantive norm is intended to deter.  Some 
of these were straightforward cases of financial corruption and complicity in drug-dealing; but in 
others, the police had purchased drugs from a target and then offered part of the seized quantity 
for sale to the target’s suppliers, for the purpose of building a case against them.   The officers’ 
law enforcement purpose did not shield them from liability, as it would their American 
counterparts.  Defining and identifying abuses becomes difficult when the legal system 
criminalizes investigative behavior that is not classically corrupt and when the distinction 
between permissible and impermissible participation in criminal activity is a subtle one.  (At the 
same time, however, Germany’s ban on committing crimes undercover may deter more abuses 
than a sweeping exemption from criminal liability, which invites American undercover 
operatives, particularly informants, to invoke fictitious law enforcement purposes in justifying 
seemingly criminal behavior.)   
 
There is a second reason why the “actuarial risks” of undercover policing pose special 
problems in Germany, beyond those which inhere in the practice per se. The ways in which 
Germany has institutionalized undercover investigations have created new challenges to control 
and have therefore heightened anxieties about the legitimacy of such operations.  Statutory 
reforms legitimated the use of elaborate and costly cover stories for deep cover agents and led to 
the creation of separate covert policing units staffed by specialized personnel.  These units 
deploy deep cover agents for long-term assignments, requiring them to live undercover for up to 
seven or ten years.  By contrast, undercover policing is not defined as a separate career path in 
the United States.  American undercover agents are deployed for much shorter periods of time, 
even on deep cover assignments, and are reintegrated into their agency and reassigned to regular 
investigative duties in-between assignments.   
 
In Germany, turning covert policing into a specialized long-term career path has 
professionalized covert agents and has helped recoup the system’s investment in training and 
infrastructure.  But this long-term use of covert personnel intensifies contacts between 
undercover agents or informants and the targets they investigate. This increases the likelihood 
that covert operatives will witness crimes, participate in the crimes, or simply lose their bearings 
and go astray.  And once they win targets’ confidence and enter into longer-term relationships 
with them, agents also become more likely to influence the crimes they investigate or to alter the 
course of events through their presence, even without overt provocation or entrapment.   The 
danger here is not just the familiar concern that undercover agents will deviate from the demands 
of the substantive norms.  In addition, Germany worries that agents will deviate in ways that go 
beyond what police supervisors and prosecutors will accept or even know about.  That deep 
cover units maintain close contacts with agents’ families and sometimes send other operatives to 
monitor agents’ doings is some indication of how seriously the police themselves take these 
risks.   At the same time, the secrecy surrounding deep-cover operations, and the likelihood that 
covert agents will never have to testify, decrease the likelihood that abuses will be exposed and 
corrected.   
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In the United States, covert policing periodically produces scandals like that which 
erupted only recently, when a single Texan undercover agent sent hundreds of residents of a 
single town to jail on fabricated claims that they had sold him narcotics.  But deep cover policing 
has not, by and large, become a separate long-term career path for police officers.  A system of 
rotating undercover agents out of deep cover roles and reintegrating them into regular 
investigative units reduces the pressures that lead to abuse.  When they do occur, scandals like 
that in Texas result from a lack of supervision and professionalism—not, as in Germany, from a 
hypotrophy of the laudable impulse to make covert policing more professional through 
specialization and the long-term commitment of trained personnel.  Ironically, then, it is the best, 
not the worst impulses of the German system that create the conditions for abuse. 
 
Conclusion Part II: Implications of German Reunification for the Legitimacy of 
Covert Policing 
 
Both Germany and the United States treat undercover policing as a necessary evil – and 
in a variety of senses.  But each system has its own understanding of what makes covert policing 
a necessary evil.  These understandings reflect disparate compromises; and they produce very 
different deficits in legitimacy.  In Germany, covert policing inevitably confronts constraints 
imposed by Germany’s interpretation of constitutional rights, its differentiation among the 
powers of the executive, and its conception of the rule of law.  In the United States, by contrast, 
undercover policing confronts fewer threshold objections to its legality.   American entrapment 
law and internal agency regulations invoke similar concerns about the corrupting influence of 
infiltrators and the risks to their own integrity.  But these concerns are simply factored in as costs 
of the undercover methods or as outside limits on what is permissible.   They do not undermine 
the legitimacy of the practice per se because they do not call into question its compatibility with 
constitutional values and the rule of law itself.   
 
German anxieties about undercover policing may well reflect the larger fears and 
uncertainties of a country redefining itself in the wake of Reunification.  Germany first codified 
the rules for undercover policing in 1992, shortly after absorbing the five new states that arose in 
the territory of the former GDR.202 Reunification brought with it new crime problems and an 
increase of right-wing extremism in the eastern states, requiring a rethinking of crime control 
strategies and renewed vigilance by the domestic intelligence services.  This in turn gave greater 
impetus to the use of undercover tactics by law enforcement as well as the APCs.  But the 
incorporation of a new population from a radically different regime also confronted Germany 
with difficult questions about the nature of the reconstituted whole.  How would he state be 
altered by the territories, peoples and problems it had absorbed?   
 
One worry which Reunification presented was the growth of right-wing extremist parties 
like the NDP in the eastern states.  This presented serious challenges to the deployment of 
undercover agents—particularly the risk of detection (or counter-surveillance) by targets.  There 
was also a possibility that the undercover agents would be required to commit crimes.  Scandals 
about APC informants producing neo-Nazi soundtracks and drafting neo-Nazi tracts intensified 
these fears.  But there was also the risk that covert operatives would not only pretend to be right-
 
202 I am making no claim, however, that Reunification was causal; other European nations, too, enacted legislation 
about undercover policing in the early 1990s. 
58
wing extremists but switch their allegiances.  Thus there were scandals about APC informants 
warning targets about upcoming police raids, so that the targets could hide incriminating 
publications.203 
The anxiety, then, was that undercover agents might lose their identity and become like 
those whom they infiltrated.  This fear resonated with other concerns that preoccupied German 
legal and political culture from the early 1990s onward.   After Reunification, the west German 
popular press and government were concerned with questions of loyalty and individual 
responsibility for repression in the GDR. Who was compromised by service to the East German 
regime, and who was not?  Could the police of the Federal Republic accept police officials from 
the former GDR?   Could it accept those who had cooperated with the Stasi?  Some officials 
from the Ministry of the Interior rejected that possibility out of hand, because “these guys would 
have to arrest themselves!”204 An individualized assessment was eventually worked out.  In a 
case-by-case evaluation, officials from the Federal Republic would examine the nature and 
extent of an east German officer’s cooperation with the Stasi.  Had an officer simply provided 
generalized assessments (“Stimmungsberichte”) or contributed to the oppression of particular 
individuals? Had he  maintained an “inner distance” from what the Stasi required him to do?205 
But even those east German officers who were accepted into the ranks of the police 
confronted western suspicions about their innermost loyalties.  As Andreas Glaeser demonstrated 
in his monograph about the reunification of the Berlin police,206 west German police responded 
with scorn or distrust if east Germans had positive things to say about even unpolitical aspects of 
life in the former GDR.  Thus the system held out to eastern officers (as it sometimes did to 
undercover agents) the possibility of being redeemed by inner distance from wrongful conduct, 
that is, from what they had to do to fit into their surroundings.  But it also suspected inner 
distance and recalcitrance in converts to the new regime and insincerity in those too eager to 
discard their old identity.   If undercover agents confronted skepticism about whether they would 
remain loyal to state or “go over” to their targets, the issue confronting the easterners, from the 
standpoint of the western press and of government agencies was the inverse; whether the 
easterners secretly remained loyal to (and compromised by) the values of the old system or had 
successfully transferred their allegiances to the new. If concerns about undercover agents 
focused on what they would become, fears about easterners centered on what they had been.  The 
form which these suspicions took was different.   But in calling into doubt the loyalties and the 
very identities of those whom western media or employers regarded as “tainted” they were the 
same.     
All this fed a climate of obsessive speculation in the west German popular press about 
what people from the east might have secretly done; what they had become after Reunification; 
where their loyalties lay; and whether they were who they appeared to be.  Western skeptics cast 
many East Germans (particularly former Stasi officers or informants)  quasi as undercover agents 
from a totalitarian past infiltrating the democratic institutions of the west.  In the years after 
Reunification, west German newspapers and magazines reported that “about 500 ex-agents [of 
 
203 “Treason in Taka-Tuka Land,” Spiegel 24/03 at 50.   
204 “They’d have to arrest themselves,” Spiegel 39/90 at 18. 
205 FAZ Feb 12, 1993, 5-6. 
206 Andreas Glaeser, Divided in Unity: Identity, Germany, and the Berlin Police (Chicago, 2000). 
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the Stasi] are believed to mingle, unrecognized, in high and highest positions in the service of the 
state and in the economy”207 and that former Stasi agents were becoming teachers and 
indoctrinating the young;208 A public debate raged about whether to amnesty Stasi informants.209 
The debate essentially centered on the definition of treason.  Foreign espionage seemed to lack 
the element of betrayal that figured in spying on one’s own compatriots and one’s state.  But 
where did this leave undercover policing?  The media sometimes portrayed infiltration of 
criminal organizations a form of honorable espionage into a closed-off entity foreign to lawful 
society; but at other times, journalists critical of the practice described it more as a trap for fellow 
citizens whom informants implicated for personal gain.210 
But western fears of infiltration from the east extended beyond concerns about former 
Stasi agents to easterners with no Stasi past.  Thus, a Spiegel reporter asked Heinz Eggert, then 
Saxon Minister of the Interior, “The status of civil servant presupposes a special allegiance to our 
state.  Can one really expect such loyalty from police officers who for many years supported a 
system of oppression?”  Eggert responded, “..What can one do?  There weren’t seventeen million 
resistance fighters in the GDR.”211 Implications of collective opportunism—of having been a 
nation of informants and collaborators with injustice—were galling to eastern Germans who had 
participated in overthrowing the GDR regime and had not only supported but demanded 
Reunification with the west.  Given the disappearance of the east German government, 
intimations of their divided loyalties were puzzling; there was no regime left to command their 
allegiance.   
 
Eastern anger at western distrust had implications for the legitimacy of undercover 
policing.  Surveillance by police and APCs—who were at first largely staffed by westerners—
was received as a kind of colonial imposition, and worse, as a resurgence of tactics and forms of 
social control that they associated with the Stasi.  Thus informants and undercover tactics per se  
were highly discredited, posing new dilemmas for police and intelligence agencies alike.   The 
Spiegel magazine reported in 1991 that western APCs met with great resistance in their attempts 
to establish APC bureaus in the east.212 The Spiegel reported that the APCs had been largely 
unsuccessful in trying to convince locals that “the APCs is as different from the Stasi as a church 
from a bordello.”213 To easterners, the Spiegel reported, “It’s a new company, but the same old 
business.”  To easterners the purpose of covert tactics was unclear.  Were they to be protected 
from criminals?  Were easterners to be protected from themselves?  Or was the west being 
protected from the east?  Matters were further complicated by the fact that the APCs report to 
parliamentary committees which, in many eastern states, might include representatives of the 
PDS, that is, the continuation of the GDR’s communist party.  Western officials claimed this 
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would undermine the ability of the APCs to function214—confirming eastern fears of western 
mistrust.   
 
And in the wake of Reunification, even west German critics of covert tactics took up the 
east German analogy.  One Socialist minister from Bonn described efforts to legalize undercover 
tactics as “an attempt to establish a police state in a democracy.”215 “Secret investigations, secret 
proceedings, secret police, secret agents—they are all hallmarks of an informant-and surveillance 
state,” he argued.216 
Such fears help account for the pervasive sense, in Germany, that undercover policing 
was a “dirty business,” and, at best, a necessary evil, and necessarily compromising to the state, 
in all the ways explored above.  The turmoil surrounding Reunification may also help explain—
if only in part—why it became essential to the legitimacy of undercover police investigations to 
prohibit undercover agents from committing or participating in or tolerating crimes.  To be sure, 
even APC agents have no legal right to engage in criminal behavior.  But the police cling to the 
principle of legality as setting them apart from the APCs and as making it, if not impossible, at 
least harder for them to turn a blind eye to unlawful conduct by targets and agents alike.   That 
undercover policing was promoted as a tool against organized crime also made sense in a 
political climate where the implicit and often explicit accusation against surveillance tactics was 
that they were being turned on society as a whole.  Organized crime—which was characterized 
as hermetic, and thus safely sealed off from society—formed a safe target for such highly 
contested tactics.  Judicial and prosecutorial supervision, disclosure requirements, and 
professionalization of covert operatives were needed to legitimate undercover tactics in a 
political climate in which the police found themselves shadowboxing not only with its past under 
the Nazis but with the fearsome public images of domestic intelligence services from west and 
east alike.  Western anxieties about being infected by chaos from the east may have contributed 
the decision to legalize and expand undercover policing—as a necessary evil, that is, a kind of 
inoculation with a safe dose of the poison from which it seeks to protect society.  But the 
legitimacy of the newly legalized powers remains bedeviled by eastern reactions to western 
mistrust and by western fears about reinventing Stasi-like surveillance institutions or of 
reproducing the recurrent aberrations of its own APCs.  
 
Ultimately, the legitimacy of a practice depends not only on the skill with which a legal 
system crafts exceptions to higher-order norms with which the practice seems to conflict.  These 
exceptions themselves reflect on the viability of the system’s ideals.  Germany’s fears about the 
extent to which covert policing compromises these norms lend undercover operations an 
unresolvable moral and legal ambiguity which may be Germany’s greatest protection against 
complacency about the powers of the police and the greatest obstacle to the rescuing these 
practices from the twilight in which they continue to languish.   
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